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Life and Death Decisions
Prosecutorial Discretion and Capital Punishment in Missouri
Katherine Barnes, David Sloss and Stephen Thaman
I.

Introduction
In every criminal justice system, there is a need to strike a balance between

conferring too much discretion on decision-makers, and granting them too little
discretion.

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have been widely criticized on the

grounds that they grant judges too little discretion over sentencing decisions. 1
Excessively narrow discretion produces one type of arbitrariness: judges are not able to
account for individualized factors that are relevant to sentencing. However, a system that
confers excessively broad discretion on decision-makers produces a different type of
arbitrariness: it yields results that are inconsistent with the fundamental principle that like
cases should be treated alike. The Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia, 2
which invalidated death penalty statutes throughout the United States, was largely
motivated by concerns about this second type of arbitrariness. The primary reason the
death penalty was ruled unconstitutional in Furman was that statutes gave too much
discretion to prosecutors and jurors to decide which murders should be punished by
death, resulting in an arbitrary system where only a small minority of those eligible for
death actually receive the penalty. 3 The results were that African-Americans and other
poor and minority defendants were disproportionately likely to be sentenced to death. 4
This article analyzes capital punishment in Missouri in an effort to assess whether
Missouri’s death penalty statute accords prosecutors such broad discretion that the
practical implementation of the statute raises the types of arbitrariness concerns at issue
in Furman. To conduct the analysis, the authors created a database of 1046 homicide
cases prosecuted in Missouri over a five year period (the “large database”). The large
database includes substantially all of the homicide cases in Missouri that satisfy the
following criteria: (1) the case was initially charged as first-degree murder (M1), second1

See, e.g., Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, To Fear Judging No More: Recommendations for the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 11 FED. SENTENCING REP. 187-188 (1999).
2
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
3
Id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“When the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial number
of the cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is virtually inescapable that it is being inflicted
arbitrarily. Indeed, it smacks of little more than a lottery system.”).
4
Id. at 249-51 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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degree murder (M2), or voluntary manslaughter (VM); (2) the initial indictment or
information was dated between Jan. 1, 1997 and Dec. 31, 2001; and (3) the defendant
was ultimately convicted of a homicide offense. 5 The authors also created a “small
sample” of 247 cases selected from the large database that we studied in greater detail. 6
We gathered substantial information about cases in the small sample, and used this
information to investigate the decision-making process in more depth, with a particular
focus on disparate racial impact and geographic disparities.
In certain respects, this article is similar to other studies that have analyzed the
implementation of capital punishment in particular states. 7 However, several features of
this study distinguish it from prior studies. First, whereas several previous studies have
focused narrowly on cases charged as M1, our large database includes cases charged as
M2 and VM. Within this broader universe, we screened cases to determine whether they
were death-eligible. In this respect, our strategy is similar to two recent studies in
Nebraska and Maryland that examined a broad range of homicide convictions and then
narrowed the class by screening cases. 8 Although cases that yield M2 or VM convictions
are not death eligible, prosecutors have broad discretion in choosing whether to charge a
case initially as M1, M2 or VM. Therefore, a study designed to discern the effects of
prosecutorial discretion on capital punishment would be seriously flawed if the database
omitted cases charged as M2 or VM.
The second point is closely related to the first. By gathering data on all cases
charged as M1, M2 or VM, we are able to provide a rough measure of how much “work”
the statute does in selecting capital cases from the broader universe of intentional
homicide cases, and how much of that “work” is left to prosecutorial discretion. The
results are illuminating. We estimate that at least 76 percent of the cases in the large
database are death-eligible under the statute; 9 the other 24 percent are not death eligible.
5

For a more precise description of the parameters for including cases in the large database, see infra

Part IV.

6

See infra Part IV (describing the selection of the small sample).
See infra Part II (providing a survey of existing literature in this area).
8
See David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death
Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska Experience, 81 Nebraska L. Rev. 486 (2002)
[hereinafter, “Nebraska Study”]; Raymond Paternoster et al., An Empirical Analysis of Maryland’s Death
Sentencing System with Respect to the Influence of Race and Legal Jurisdiction), available at
http://www.newsdesk.umd.edu/pdf/finalrep.pdf. [hereinafter, “Maryland Study”].
9
See infra Part V (explaining how this estimate is derived).
7

2
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Only 2.5 percent of the cases yielded death verdicts. In another 2.5 percent of the cases,
juries or trial judges rejected a capital charge presented by a prosecutor.

Thus,

death

eligible cases in which prosecutors chose not to pursue capital charges comprise at least
71 percent of the cases in the large database. Therefore, in rough terms, prosecutors are
doing three times as much “work” as the statute in deciding which cases merit capital
punishment, because the statute eliminated only 24 percent of the cases from the class of
death-eligible offenses, whereas prosecutors eliminated 71 percent by electing not to
pursue capital charges. These figures suggest that the Missouri legislature has largely
abdicated its responsibility to establish statutory limits on capital punishment and
delegated that legislative function to individual prosecutors.
A third distinguishing feature of this study relates to the fact that Missouri is the
subject of the study. Most recent empirical studies of capital punishment in specific
states have focused on states, such as Nebraska and Maryland, that have executed very
few people. 10 In contrast, Missouri is one of the nation’s leading death penalty states.
Having executed 66 prisoners since the death penalty was reinstated, Missouri ranks
fourth in the country in the total number of executions since 1976, behind Texas, Virginia
and Oklahoma, and just ahead of Florida. 11 Missouri ranks fifth in per capita terms,
behind Oklahoma, Texas, Delaware and Virginia. 12 Ours is the only recent study, except
for an ABA-sponsored study of Florida, 13 that provides a detailed empirical analysis of
capital punishment in one of the “top five” death penalty states.
The fourth distinguishing feature of this study is the empirical investigation of
disparities in the rates at which different prosecutors pursue M1 charges versus lesser
homicide charges. We know of no other study that investigates this issue, although many
10

Maryland has executed only five people since 1976. Nebraska has executed three people. See
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=1110.
11
Texas is in first place with 382 executions, followed by Virginia with 98 and Oklahoma with 84.
Trailing closely behind Missouri are Florida with 64 executions, North Carolina with 43 and Georgia with
39. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state/.
12
After rounding off the July 2006 populations of the states in millions to one decimal point,
Missouri executed 11.4 per million population since 1976. Oklahoma led with 23.3 per million, followed
by Texas with 16.3, Delaware with 15.5 and Virginia with 12.9. Census data
from,http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GCTTable?_bm=y
&-geo_id=01000US&-_box_head_nbr=GCT-T1&-ds_name=PEP_2006_EST&-_lang=en&-redoLog=false
&-format=US-9&-mt_name=PEP_2006_EST_GCTT1R_US9S&-_sse=on.
13
See American Bar Association, Evaluating Fairness and Accuracy in State Death Penalty Systems:
The
Florida
Death
Penalty
Assessment
Report
(2006),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/moratorium/assessmentproject/florida.html. [hereinafter, “Florida Study”].
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studies have investigated death sentencing. Because there are many more M1 convictions
than death sentences, and because M1 convictions are punished much more harshly than
M2 convictions, disparities between M1 and lesser convictions have significant practical
implications.
One other distinguishing feature relates to the interplay between race and
geography.

Other studies that have examined geographic disparities in the

implementation of capital punishment in particular states have tended to divide counties
within the state between rural and urban. 14 We use the urban/rural divide, but we also
divide counties according to the racial composition of the jury pool in different counties.
One of this study’s more interesting findings is that there is a statistically significant
correlation between jury decision-making in capital trials and the demographics of the
jury pool.
This study examines both geographic and racial disparities in the implementation
of capital punishment in Missouri. We examine these disparities in two different decision
processes: the M1 conviction process and the death sentence process. Each of these
decisions is further broken down into three critical decision-making points. For the M1
conviction process, these are: 1) The decision whether to charge M1 versus a lesser
homicide charge; (2) the decision whether to go to trial on an M1 charge; and (3) the
factfinder’s decision whether to convict the defendant on the M1 charge. For the death
penalty decision process, the three stages are: 1) the decision whether to seek the death
penalty; 2) the subsequent decision whether to accept a plea agreement or take the capital
charge to trial; and 3) the final decision whether to impose a death sentence. The
geographic analysis focuses on disparities across counties in the way these decisions are
made. The racial analysis focuses on disparities based on race of defendant and race of
victim.

These analyses do not adjust for the culpability of the individual, or the

heinousness of the crime. Instead, the project provides a description of the disparities
created across important fault lines by the decisions made by prosecutors, factfinders and
defendants, whether justified by outside factors or not. 15
14

See, e.g., Nebraska study, supra note 8.
In future work, we plan to measure the culpability of the defendant and the heinousness of the
crime, in order to control for these factors and investigate any potential causal connections between
geography and race and the decision-making processes for M1 convictions and death sentences.
15

4

The key findings related to racial disparities are as follows. First, we found no
significant race-based effects in the decision to charge M1 rather than a lesser-included
homicide offense, or in the final M1 conviction rate. There were significant disparities,
however, in the decision to take an M1 charge to trial, across both race-of-defendant and
race-of-victim. Black defendants are less likely to face an M1 trial than white defendants,
although their overall M1 conviction rate is similar. Stated differently, black defendants
are more likely to accept an M1 guilty plea, whereas white defendants are more likely to
be convicted of M1 after a trial, but these two avenues lead to similar M1 conviction
rates. Second, we found significant and persistent racial disparities in the capital
sentencing decision process. Black defendants were less likely to face a capital charge,
but more likely, once charged, to face a capital trial than white defendants. Overall, black
defendants were less likely to be sentenced to death, although the sentencing rates
depended significantly on the race of the victim as well, with defendants who kill white
victims sentenced to death more often than those who kill black victims.
The data show that prosecutorial decisions vary widely across counties. Indeed,
the variation begins with the decision whether to charge a homicide case as M1 or M2.
For example, St. Louis City and Jackson County (Kansas City) are the two largest
jurisdictions in Missouri in terms of the number of homicide prosecutions. Prosecutors in
St. Louis City charged M1 in 85.4 percent of their cases. In contrast, prosecutors in
Jackson County charged M1 in only 28.3 percent of their cases. Because cases charged
as M2 are not eligible for capital punishment, Jackson County prosecutors eliminated
more than seventy percent of their cases from the class of death-eligible offenses by
charging the cases as M2 instead of M1. 16 In contrast, the initial charging decisions of
St. Louis City prosecutors left the death penalty “on the table” in more than 85 percent of
their cases. As the subsequent analysis demonstrates, there are significant variations
across counties in all stages of the decision-making process. These geographic disparities
mean that a homicide defendant in one county is more likely to receive a death sentence
than a homicide defendant in another county.

16

This assumes that most cases that were charged as M2 satisfy the statutory requirements for an M1
charge. For a defense of this proposition, see infra notes __ and accompanying text.

5

The analysis in this article provides a statistical snapshot of homicide cases in
Missouri, focusing on how the discretionary decisions of prosecutors correlate with racial
and geographic disparities along the divide between M1 and lesser homicide offenses,
and along the divide between death sentences and lesser sentences. It bears emphasis,
though, that the analysis does not support any conclusions about causal relationships
between prosecutorial decisions and geographic/racial disparities. Investigation of causal
relationships between prosecutorial decisions and different outcomes requires the
introduction of control variables; that will be the focus of a subsequent study
The remainder of this article is divided into seven parts. Part II provides a brief
survey of scholarly literature involving empirical analysis of homicide cases in other
states, with a particular focus on studies of capital punishment. Part III provides a brief
overview of the relevant law and practice in Missouri, focusing on the ways in which
Missouri law broadens the scope of prosecutorial discretion. Part IV discusses our
methodology and research design. Part V presents a rough quantitative measurement of
the scope of prosecutorial discretion.

Part VI analyzes both racial and geographic

disparities across the M1 versus M2 dividing line.

Part VII investigates the

implementation of the death penalty in Missouri, focusing on geographic and racial
disparities in charging and sentencing outcomes.

Part VIII presents conclusions and

policy recommendations.
II.
Literature Review
Much modern empirical research on the death penalty focuses on discretionary
choices made by prosecutors and juries that influence the application of the death penalty.
Our study is no exception: we focus on the decisions that Missouri prosecutors make in
charging and plea bargaining, and how other actors in the system curtail the discretion
that prosecutors exercise. The goal, as with other studies, is to determine how the death
penalty is applied, with particular attention to racial disparities and “arbitrariness”, which
is generally defined as unexplained differences or differences explained only by
geography or other unacceptable factors. Since the landmark study by David Baldus and
co-authors on the Georgia death penalty, 17 there have been many excellent articles
17

DAVID C. BALDUS, ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1990).
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describing the interplay between prosecutorial discretion and the death penalty in several
states. 18 Overall, these studies find that race impacts the decision-making process,
particularly the initial decision to seek the death penalty. The most robust finding across
all death penalty studies is that individuals who kill white victims are more likely to
receive the death penalty. 19 Studies that investigate geographic differences also find that
location matters; these studies usually investigate urban centers versus more rural areas,
and find that decision-making is different across these different locations. Two recent
studies of the Nebraska and the Philadelphia death penalty systems, both also performed
by a team of researchers led by Baldus, provide an excellent, detailed summary of the
research through 2002. 20

We need not replicate that discussion here. Instead, we

highlight some commonalities between the prior research and our own, as well as the
differences in our approach, and discuss some of the more recent research.
The Nebraska study, investigating an entire state system, is most similar to our
own. In that study, researchers investigated several decision-making points: the decision
to charge a death-eligible crime; the decision to seek the death penalty at some point in
the pretrial process; the decision to proceed to a capital trial on guilt; the decision to
proceed to a penalty trial after the defendant is found guilty of a death-eligible crime,
and, finally, the jury’s decision to impose death. These are the five critical decisionmaking points in the process that ultimately leads to a death sentence. Using a dataset of
all death-eligible crimes, the Nebraska study found no evidence that race impacts the
decision-making process in Nebraska. 21 It did find, however, significant geographic
effects, with large differences between the urban centers in Nebraska and the rural areas.
18

Several ABA-sponsored studies have studied the entire death penalty practice in particular states.
To date, researchers in Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee
have published studies regarding their state’s death penalty practices as a part of the ABA Death Penalty
Moratoriam Implementation Project.. See http://www.abanet.org/moratorium/home.html. These studies all
focus on the same basic questions, investigating the entire death penalty process, from charging practices
through execution itself, and include all the potential actors in the system: prosecutors, defense attorneys,
judges, juries, legislatures and the governor. These studies are particularly valuable in their comprehensive
research on the entire system, from filing a notice to seek the death penalty to any potential pardon, and
finally to an execution.
19
Still, this finding does not appear in all states, or all time periods. See Nebraska Study, supra note
8, at 499-502.
20
See Nebraska Study, supra note 8, at 499-502; David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and
the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview with Recent Findings from
Philadelphia, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1638, 1658-60 (1998).
21
Nebraska Study, supra note 8, at ___.
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In Nebraska, the urban centers treat all crimes more harshly. 22

Because these two

locations have different demographics, the study did find evidence of an adverse
disparate impact on minority defendants due to the location of their crimes. 23 The study
used similar methodology to ours, screening a large number of homicide cases to
determine death eligibility, and then coding a large amount of information about each
death eligible case.
In addition, a 2002 Maryland study, performed by Raymond Paternoster and coauthors, found that defendants who killed white victims were more likely to face a capital
trial and more likely to be sentenced to death. 24
geographic disparities across counties.

The study also found significant

Both of these findings, however, should be

tempered by the fact that the study controls for culpability only by including the number
of statutory aggravators in a case. 25
Both the Nebraska study and the Maryland study had the advantage of being
state-sponsored.

Because the present study was not state-sponsored, we confronted

certain obstacles in data collection, which led to significant gaps in data collection for
some cases. 26 We rely on estimates based on a detailed analysis of a stratified random
sub-sample of cases to fill in the gaps. In contrast, the authors of the Nebraska and
Maryland studies were able to obtain fairly complete information about each case. This
leads to more precise estimates 27 of the disparities in death penalty application. The
information gaps in the present study primarily impact the first two steps in the decisionmaking process (charging M1 and seeking death), because all cases charged as capital
cases are included in our sub-sample. These two data problems – lack of data (because of

22

Id. at ___
The interplay of geographic differences in charging practice and racial patterns of violence is
important. Do urban centers treat crimes more harshly because of location, or because of the race of those
who commit the crimes?
24
Maryland Study, supra note 8, at __.
25
The number of statutory aggravators is not an especially good measure of culpability because there
tends to be a great deal of overlap among statutory aggravators, especially in states with a large number of
aggravators. Thus, the number of statutory aggravators in a case may say as much about the drafting of the
statute and the prosecutor’s charging decisions as it does about the culpability of the individual defendant.
26
See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
27
Some would say that measures based on complete information are not estimates at all, but a
perfect description of the universe of death penalty cases in the state in question. We do not engage in this
philosophical debate over the appropriate nomenclature for study of a population; we only point out that the
results we present in Part VII are, in fact, estimates based upon a sample of cases.
23
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the small number of capital homicides) and the expense of obtaining the data available –
are present to some extent in all death penalty studies.
Beyond data constraints, there are four key methodological issues that studies of
this nature must address: (1) determining the population of cases to be investigated; (2)
defining which cases are “death eligible”; (3) deciding what source(s) of data to utilize;
and (4) developing measures to control for crime-specific characteristics, where
appropriate, that properly inform the charging and sentencing decisions. With respect to
the first point, for the reasons specified above, 28 the present study investigates a
population of cases that includes substantially all of the intentional homicide cases
prosecuted in Missouri over a five year period. Recent comprehensive studies have
adopted a similar approach, although some studies focus only on cases charged as capital
cases. 29
Secondly, this study uses a probable cause standard to determine which cases are
death-eligible. 30 Prior studies generally use a more conservative standard for assessing
death eligibility. For example, the Maryland study requires “clear evidence” that the
crime satisfies all the statutory requirements for capital punishment. 31 We use the lower
“probable cause” standard because that is the only legal requirement necessary to indict
for first degree murder and to seek the death penalty. Although prosecutors must prove
the case beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury, most cases end in plea bargaining.
Thirdly, this study uses a variety of data sources to investigate cases in the small
sample, including police investigative reports, FBI records of criminal histories, court
records, newspaper articles and appellate decisions. The goal is to recreate as closely as
possible the data available to the prosecutor at the time the prosecutor makes initial
charging and plea bargaining decisions. Other studies gather facts from pre-sentencing
reports and trial transcripts. We chose not to use trial transcripts because most of the

28

See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
See, e.g., ABA Death Penalty Moratorium Project, supra note 18
30
Specifically, a crime initially charged as M2 or VM is “M1-eligible” if a prosecutor could make a
good faith, reasonable argument that the statutory requirements for M1 are satisfied. Additionally, all
crimes charged as M1 are deemed M1-eligible. An M1-eligible crime in which the prosecution did not
seek death is “death-eligible” if the prosecution could make a good faith, reasonable argument that one or
more statutory aggravating factors is present. Additionally, all cases charged as capital crimes are deemed
death-eligible.
31
See Maryland Study, supra note 8, at __.
29
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cases we investigated were resolved by plea agreements. Pre-sentencing reports have
advantages when focusing solely on the decision whether to sentence an individual to
death, because they provide more balanced information about mitigating and aggravating
factors, similar to what would be presented in a penalty trial. But prosecutors in Missouri
often do not have this information when making pre-trial decisions. Hence, the
information would not explain any of the charging and plea bargaining decisions made
before trial, which are a central focus of this study. Due to the decision not to use presentencing reports, we are missing information about mitigating factors in some cases
that would be useful in controlling for culpability.
The final methodological difference between this study and prior studies relates to
whether to control for culpability. Our study does not focus on the causal link between
race or geography and capital punishment. Thus, there is no need to control for
culpability. Instead, we focus on the racial and geographic disparities associated with
prosecutorial decision making. These disparities may be justified by other factors, but
they exist nonetheless, and inform our judgment of how the criminal justice system
works. As noted above, we plan to do a follow-on study that will control for culpability
and examine causal relationships between prosecutorial decision-making and racial and
geographic disparities.
III.
Law and Practice in Missouri
Part III briefly summarizes Missouri law governing the implementation of capital
punishment, providing comparisons to other key death penalty states to give the reader an
impression of the ways in which Missouri is both typical and atypical. The discussion
focuses on the ways in which Missouri law both narrows and broadens the scope of
prosecutorial discretion in comparison to other states.
A.

Classification of Homicide as Murder

There are 39 death penalty jurisdictions in the United States, including 38 states
and the federal government. Twenty-four of those 39 jurisdictions separate murder into

10

two degrees. 32 In contrast, fifteen of those jurisdictions have only one degree of
murder. 33 Missouri, like most states, divides murder into first degree and second degree
murder.
Under Missouri law, “a person commits the crime of murder in the first degree if
he knowingly causes the death of another person after deliberation upon the matter.” 34
There are only two permissible punishments for first degree murder in Missouri: the
death penalty, or life imprisonment without eligibility for probation or parole (LWOP). 35
The crime of second degree murder includes both felony murder and homicides where
the perpetrator acted “with the purpose of causing serious physical injury to another
person.” 36 Additionally, any homicide where the defendant “knowingly causes the death
of another person” qualifies as second degree murder. 37 The punishment for second
degree murder is much lighter than it is for first degree murder. Second degree murder is
punishable as a Class A felony 38 by 10-30 years imprisonment, or by life imprisonment
with eligibility for parole. 39
The statutory definition of murder in Missouri narrows the class of death-eligible
offenses in two significant respects. First, most states classify some forms of reckless
homicide as murder, thereby making at least some reckless homicides death-eligible. In
contrast, Missouri classifies all reckless homicides as manslaughter, not murder. 40
Because manslaughter is not a death-eligible crime, the legislative decision to classify all

32

Jurisdictions that divide murder into two degrees are: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington,
Wyoming and the Federal System.
33
Jurisdictions with one degree of murder are: Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, and
Utah.
34
V.A.M.S. § 565.020.
35
V.A.M.S. ' 565.020(2).
36
V.A.M.S. § 565.021.
37
Id.
38
V.A.M.S. ' 565.021(2).
39
V.A.M.S. ' 558.011(1)(1).
40
See V.A.M.S. § 565.024. In addition to Missouri, there are nine other death penalty states that
classify reckless homicide as manslaughter, not murder. See Ala.Code 1975 ' 13A-6-2(a)(1);
Conn.Gen..Stats,.Ann. ' 53a-54a; Ga. Code Ann., ' 16-5-1; Ind. Code 35-42-1-1(1)(1); Ky. Rev. Stats. '
507.020(1); La. Stat. Ann.-R.S. 14:30(1); Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-102(1); N.J.Stats..Ann.. 2C:11-3(a);
Or.Rev..Stats. ' 163.115(1)(a).
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reckless homicides as manslaughter narrows the class of death-eligible offenses, and
thereby narrows the scope of prosecutorial discretion.
Second, most states that divide murder into degrees classify felony murder as
first-degree murder, 41 thereby making at least some felony murders death-eligible (even
if the defendant did not intend to kill the victim).42 Missouri, however, classifies felony
murder as second-degree, not first degree murder. 43 Consequently, felony murder is not
death eligible in Missouri unless the prosecutor can prove that the defendant killed the
victim “knowingly . . . after deliberation upon the matter.” 44 The legislative decision to
classify felony murder as second degree murder also narrows the class of death-eligible
offenses, and narrows the scope of prosecutorial discretion.
Whereas Missouri’s legislative classification of felony murder and reckless
homicide narrows the class of death-eligible offenses, Missouri’s definition of
“deliberation” broadens the class of death-eligible offenses. Among the death penalty
states with two degrees of murder, there is a split between those that require serious
reflection before an intentional murder will be raised to first degree murder, 45 and those
41

See, e.g., Ariz. Rev..Stats.. ' 13-1105(2); Cal Penal Code ' 189; Colo. Rev. .Stats. .Ann.. '
18-3-102(1)(a); West's Fla Stats..Ann. ' 782.04 (1)(a)(2); Idaho Code. ' 18-4003 (d); Kan. Stats. '
21-3401(1)(b); Md. Code, Criminal Law, ' 2-201(A)(4); Neb.Rev.St. ' 28-303A(2); Nev. Rev. Stats.
200.030(1)(b); N. M. Stats. Ann. 1978, ' 30-2-1(A) (2); N.C.Gen. Stats. Ann. ' 14-17; 21 Okl. Stats. Ann. '
701.7 (B); SD Crim Laws ' 22-16-4 (2); Tenn. Code Ann. ' 39-13-202 (a)(2); Va. Code Ann. ' 18.2-32;
West's Rev. Codes Wash. Ann. 9A.32.030(1)(c); Wyo. Stats. 1977 ' 6-2-101 (a); 18 U.S.C. ' 1111. In
addition to Missouri, at least three other death penalty states categorize felony murder as second-degree
murder. See 11 Del.Code. ' 635 (2); La. Stats. Ann-R.S. 14:30.1(2)(a); 8 Pa.Cons. Stats. Ann. ' 2502(b).
42
Historically, any death ensuing from the commission of one of the “big five” crimes (robbery,
burglary, rape, arson and kidnapping) was automatically first degree, capital murder, without more. The
majority of capital jurisdictions still recognize deaths during the commission of the “big five” crimes as
potentially capital murder, whether they have one or two degrees of murder. However, for defendants
convicted of murder on a felony murder theory, the Eighth Amendment restricts application of the death
penalty to: a) individuals who killed or intended to kill,; or b) individuals who were a major participant in
the crime and manifested extreme recklessness. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
43
V.A.M.S. ' 565.021(1)(2) provides for second-degree murder “when another person is killed as a
result of the perpetration or attempted perpetration” of any felony or the flight therefrom.
44
V.A.M.S. § 565.020.
45
Ariz. Rev. Stats. ' 13-1105(A)(1), State v. Thompson, 65 P.3d 420, 424 (Ariz. 2003); Cal. Penal
Code ' 189, People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942, 945 (Cal. 1968).; Colo. Rev. Stats. Ann. ' 18-3-102(1)(a),
Key v. People, 715 P.2d 319, 321 (Colo. 1986).; West's Fla. Stats. Ann. ' 782.04(1)(a)(1), Dupree v. State,
615 So.2d 713, 715 (Fla. App.1993); Idaho Code '' 18-4001- 18-4003, State v. Sheahan, 77 P.3d 956, 970
(Idaho 2003); Kan. Stats. ' 21-3401(1), State v. White, 950 P.2d 1316, 1325 (Kan. 1997); MD Code,
Criminal Law, ' 2-201(A), Bryant v. State, 900 A.2d 227, 238-39 (Md. 2006); Neb.Rev.St. ' 28-303A, State
v. Batiste, 437 N.W.2d 125, 132 (Neb. 1989); Ohio Revised Code, ' 2903.01: Tenn. Code Ann. ' 39-13-202
(d); West's Rev. Code Wash. Ann. § 9A.32.030(1)(a), 32.020(1)(a); Wyo. Stats. 1977 ' 6-2-101 (a),
Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486, 493 (Wyo. 1992); N. M. Stats. Ann. 1978, ' 30-2-1(A), State v. Lucero,
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which hold that “premeditation,” and/or “deliberation” may take place immediately
before or simultaneous with the formation of the intent to kill, i.e., in a “twinkling of an
eye”. 46 Missouri is a “twinkling of an eye” state. “Deliberation” is the key criterion in
the Missouri statute that separates first-degree murder from “knowing” second degree
murder. 47 “Deliberation” is defined as “cool reflection for any length of time no matter
how brief.” 48

As the following analysis demonstrates, under Missouri case law the

“deliberation” requirement is satisfied in almost every case involving “knowing” second
degree murder.

Thus, the only real difference between first degree murder and

“knowing” second degree murder is the severity of the punishment.
Under Missouri case law, evidence of “deliberation” is usually deduced from the
circumstantial evidence of a culprit’s actions. 49 It is sufficient “deliberation” if the intent
to kill is formulated before the lethal blow is struck. 50 There need not be any “brooding”
over the act for an appreciable time before the defendant commences the fatal attack.51
Missouri courts have consistently held that “deliberation” may be found if the intent to
kill develops, in cases involving firearms, as the trigger is being pulled. In stabbings and
other cases, deliberation may be based on the fact that the defendant had to approach the
victim before attacking. 52 The fact that the defendant armed himself with a deadly

541 P.2d 430, 432 (N.M. 1975); N.C.Gen. Stats. Ann. ' 14-17: State v. Myers, 305 S.E.2d 506, 509 (N.C.
1983).
46
For other “twinkling of an eye” states, see, e.g., 8 Pa.Cons. Stats. Ann.. ' 2502(a), Commonwealth
v. Carrol, 194 A.2d 911, 916 (Pa. 1963); SDCrim. Law ' 22-16-5; Nev. Rev. Stats. 200.030(1), Schoels v.
State, 966 P.2d 735, 738 (1998); Va. Code Ann. ' 18.2-32, Weeks v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 379, 390
(Va. 1994).
47
Missouri classifies a homicide as first degree murder if a defendant “knowingly causes the death
of another person after deliberation upon the matter.” V.A.M.S. § 565.020. A defendant who knowingly
causes the death of another person without “deliberation” is guilty of second degree murder. V.A.M.S. §
565.021.
48
V.A.M.S. § 565.002(3).
49
The Missouri Supreme Court has held that repeated listening to a rap song which glorified killing
could be introduced as circumstantial evidence of “deliberation.” State v. Tisius, 92 S.W.3d 751, 781 (Mo.
2002).
50
The Missouri Supreme Court has stated that “in order to convict [a defendant of first degree
murder], there must be some evidence that defendant made a decision to kill the victims prior to the
murder” as long as the defendant “coolly deliberated on the deaths for some amount of time, however
short." State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369, 376-77 (Mo. 1994).
51
State v. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d 1, 11 (Mo.1991).
52
State v. Clemons, 753 S.W.2d 901, 906 (Mo. 1988) (taking “a few steps” towards the victim is
sufficient).
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weapon before a confrontation has often been sufficient evidence of “deliberation.” 53
Drawing one’s weapon can be sufficient evidence of “deliberation.” 54

Other

instantaneous means of preparation for the deadly assault may be deemed sufficient. 55
First-degree murder convictions are typically upheld in cases involving “a prolonged
struggle, multiple wounds, or repeated blows.” 56 This holds true even where the initial
attack may have been the result of provocation. 57 Chasing or following the victim for
some distance has sufficed to uphold a verdict of “deliberation.” 58 The Missouri courts
have routinely upheld findings of “deliberation” if the method of killing intrinsically
requires more time to consummate, such as by poisoning, strangulation, suffocation,
drowning or severe beating or stomping. 59 The fact that a defendant could have halted an
attack, yet persisted, has also been held to be evidence of “deliberation.” 60
Evidence of the defendant’s conduct after an attack has been used to uphold the
trier of fact’s finding of “deliberation.” Examples of this are the failure of the defendant
to attempt to save the life of his wounded victim, 61 or the hiding or disposal of the body
of the victim. 62 Even flight and disposing of the weapon has been deemed to be evidence

53

State v. Ervin, 979 S.W.2d 149, 159 (Mo. 1998); State v. Stacy, 913 S.W.2d 384, 386-87
(Mo.App. 1996).
54
State v. Davis, 653 S.W.2d 167, 172 (Mo.App. 1983).
55
State v. Mallett, 732 S.W.2d 527, 533 (Mo. 1987) (slipping out of handcuffs to attack police
officers).
56
State v. Clark, 913 S.W.2d 399, 404 (Mo.App.1996) (three shots were fired); State v. Stacy, 913
S.W.2d 384, 386 (Mo. App. 1996) (14 stab wounds); State v. Ervin, 979 S.W.2d at 159 (defendant bashed
in the head of the victim several times and then threw him into a fire).
57
In State v. Santillan, 948 S.W.2d 574, 577 (Mo. 1997), the defendant twice shot the victim, who
was dating his girlfriend. While such evidence was sufficient for a jury to find “deliberation” it was error
not to give a second-degree murder instruction.
58
In State v. Hatfield, 465 S.W.2d 468 (Mo.1971), a conviction of first degree murder following a
court trial was affirmed, where two men had a disagreement in a tavern and agreed to take their differences
outside. As they were leaving one broke a beer bottle against the doorsill and pursued the other up the alley,
inflicting fatal wounds with the broken bottle. Only seconds elapsed between the time the defendant armed
himself and the infliction of the fatal wound, and the defendant was obviously in an agitated state.
59
State v. Parkus, 753 S.W.2d 881, 884-85 (Mo.1988) (choking); State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51,
72 (Mo. 1988) (stomping to death).
60
State v. Ervin, 979 S.W.2d at 159. In State v. Davis, 107 S.W.3d 410, 414-15 (Mo.App. 2003),
the defendant stole a woman’s car but her child was left attached to a seatbelt and dragging along the road
as defendant made his get-away; defendant kept driving, though he was repeatedly told that the child was
being dragged.
61
State v. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d at 12.
62
Though such evidence can admittedly be consistent also with a cover-up or a second-degree
murder: State v. Santillan, 948 S.W.2d at 576.
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of “deliberation.” 63 Tying up the victim to prevent seeking aid is also evidence of
“deliberation.” 64
The lack of any meaningful distinction between “knowingly causing death” and
“deliberation” has been challenged on due process grounds in the higher courts of the
state, but to no avail. 65 The result is that all intentional homicides based on feelings of
revenge or carried out in connection with some other unlawful purpose, can be qualified
as having been committed “with deliberation upon the matter.” The jury may return a
verdict of first-degree murder, thereby opening up the possibility of a death sentence, as
long as there is insufficient evidence of “violent passion suddenly aroused by some
provocation” 66 to justify a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. Thus, under Missouri law,
prosecutors, judges and juries have virtually unlimited discretion to choose between first
and second degree murder in all cases where an intent to kill is present.
In contrast to Missouri, several states that divide murder into degrees require a
more precise distinction between the mental states required for non-capital second degree
murder and a potentially capital finding of first degree murder. One of the leading states
in this respect is California, which has interpreted its murder statute to require something
more than mere pre-existing intent to kill to constitute “premeditation and deliberation.”
The seminal case involved a brutal killing of the 10 year-old daughter of defendant’s
girlfriend, committed when the defendant had been drinking, in which the defendant
stabbed her 60 times. 67 Missouri courts would have upheld a first degree “deliberate”
murder conviction without problem in such a case. The California Supreme Court, on the
other hand, held that the mere fact of the brutality of a killing and the infliction of
multiple injuries would not itself be sufficient to prove “premeditation and
deliberation.” 68 It noted that “the legislative classification of murder into two degrees
would be meaningless if ‘deliberation’ and ‘premeditation’ were construed as requiring
no more reflection than may be involved in the mere formation of a specific intent to
63

State v. Tisius, 92 S.W.3d at 764.
State v. Stacy, 913 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Mo. App. 1996).
65
State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 851-52 (Mo. 1998); State v. Middleton, 998 S.W.2d 520, 524
(Mo.1999); State v. Strong, 142 S.W.3d 702, 716 (Mo. 2004).
66
State v. Dickson, 691 S.W.2d 334, 339 (Mo. App. 1985); State v. Anderson, 384 S.W.2d 591, 608
(Mo. 1964).
67
People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942, 945 (Cal. 1968).
68
Id., at 947.
64
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kill. 69 The California Supreme Court then listed three categories of evidence which
could support a finding of first degree murder: (1) “planning activity -- facts regarding
the defendant’s behavior prior to the killing which might indicate a design to take life;”
(2) facts about the defendant’s prior relationship or behavior with the victim which might
indicate a motive to kill; and (3) evidence regarding the nature or manner of the killing
which indicate a deliberate intention to kill according to a preconceived design.”70
The District of Columbia courts also require more than a mere intent to kill for a
murder to rise to the first degree. The Court of Appeals has stated:
To speak of premeditation and deliberation which are instantaneous, or
which take no appreciable time, is a contradiction in terms. It deprives the
statutory requirement of all meaning and destroys the statutory distinction
between first and second degree murder. At common law there were no
degrees of murder. If the accused had no overwhelming provocation to
kill, he was equally guilty whether he carried out his murderous intent at
once or after mature reflection. Statutes like ours, which distinguish
deliberate and premeditated murder from other murder, reflect a belief that
one who meditates an intent to kill and then deliberately executes it is
more dangerous, more culpable or less capable of reformation than one
who kills on sudden impulse; or that the prospect of the death penalty is
more likely to deter men from deliberate than from impulsive murder. The
deliberate killer is guilty of first degree murder; the impulsive killer is
not. 71
In accord with the California approach, the District of Columbia has held that even
sordid, over-determined violent killings do not rise to murder of the first degree if they
were committed “impulsively, in the heat of passion, or in an orgy of frenzied activity." 72
The California approach laid out in Anderson has also been adopted in
Wyoming 73 and West Virginia. 74 The Arizona Supreme Court also recently cleared up
the muddled difference between first and second degree murder by distancing itself from
an interpretation of “premeditation” that allowed it to be found upon a mere pre-existing
intent to kill and that did not require any actual proof of reflection. It held that “laws
69

Id., at 948.
Id. at 949.
71
Bullock v. United States, 122 F.2d 213, 213-14 (D.C.App. 1941).
72
Hall v. United States, 454 A.2d 314, 317 (D.C.1982).
73
Neither the excessive brutality of a killing, nor the striking of repeated blows with a weapon are
sufficient to establish premeditation. Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486, 493-495 (Wyo. 1992).
74
State v. Guthrie, 461 S.E.2d 163, 180-81 (W.Va. 1995). The court held that the old “twinkling of
an eye” instructions were “confusing, if not meaningless.”
70
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must provide explicit standards for those charged with enforcing them and may not
impermissibly delegate basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis." 75
In sum, if an intent to kill develops rashly as a result of motives that are
insufficient to reduce a crime to voluntary manslaughter, Missouri calls such homicides
“deliberate.” Thus, numerous homicides that would be classified as non-capital second
degree murder in California and other states are classified as first degree murder in
Missouri, and are potentially death eligible.
B.

Statutory Aggravating Factors

A defendant convicted of first-degree murder in Missouri is not eligible for capital
punishment unless the prosecution proves one or more statutory aggravating factors
beyond a reasonable doubt. 76
aggravating factors.

The Missouri Penal Code lists seventeen statutory

This article uses the following abbreviations to refer to the

seventeen statutory aggravators: prior record, 77 multiple homicide, 78 hazardous device,79
for money, 80 public official, 81 agent or employee, 82 wantonly vile, 83 peace officer,84

75

State v. Thompson, 65 P.3d 420, 424, 429 (Ariz. 2003).
V.A.M.S. § 565.030.4.
77
V.A.M.S. § 565.032.2(1) (“The offense was committed by a person with a prior record of
conviction for murder in the first degree, or the offense was committed by a person who has one or more
serious assaultive criminal convictions.”).
78
V.A.M.S. § 565.032.2(2) (“The murder in the first degree was committed while the offender was
engaged in the commission or attempted commission of another unlawful homicide.”).
79
V.A.M.S. § 565.032.2(3) (“The offender by his act of murder in the first degree knowingly created
a great risk of death to more than one person by means of a weapon or device which would normally be
hazardous to the lives of more than one person.”).
80
V.A.M.S. § 565.032.2(4) (“The offender committed the offense of murder in the first degree for
himself or another, for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value from the
victim of the murder or another.”).
81
V.A.M.S. § 565.032.2(5) (“The murder in the first degree was committed against a judicial officer,
former judicial officer, prosecuting attorney or former prosecuting attorney, circuit attorney or former
circuit attorney, assistant prosecuting attorney or former assistant prosecuting attorney, assistant circuit
attorney or former assistant circuit attorney, peace officer or former peace officer, elected official or former
elected official during or because of the exercise of his official duty.”).
82
V.A.M.S. § 565.032.2(6) (“The offender caused or directed another to commit murder in the first
degree or committed murder in the first degree as an agent or employee of another person.”).
83
V.A.M.S. § 565.032.2(7) (“The murder in the first degree was outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, or depravity of mind.”).
84
V.A.M.S. § 565.032.2(8) (“The murder in the first degree was committed against any peace
officer, or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duty.”).
76
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escaped custody, 85 avoiding arrest, 86 felony murder, 87 killing witness, 88 corrections
officer, 89 hijacking, 90 concealing drug crime, 91 other drug crime, 92 and gang activity. 93
The number and breadth of statutory aggravators in Missouri tends to expand the
class of death-eligible offenses, thereby broadening the scope of prosecutorial discretion.
With seventeen statutory aggravating factors, Missouri ranks eighth among the 38 death
penalty states in terms of the number of statutory aggravators. 94 In general, states with a
greater number of statutory aggravators give prosecutors more discretion to decide which
cases should be charged as capital cases. The sheer number of aggravators is only part of
the story, though, because states vary widely in the breadth of individual aggravators. It
is not necessary for the purposes of this study to compare the breadth of statutory
aggravators in different states. In Part V.B, infra, we provide a quantitative measurement
of the breadth of statutory aggravators in Missouri.
C.

Voluntary Manslaughter

85

V.A.M.S. § 565.032.2(9) (“The murder in the first degree was committed by a person in, or who
has escaped from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement.”).
86
V.A.M.S. § 565.032.2(10) (“The murder in the first degree was committed for the purpose of
avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of
himself or another.”).
87
V.A.M.S. § 565.032.2(11) (“The murder in the first degree was committed while the defendant
was engaged in the perpetration or was aiding or encouraging another person to perpetrate or attempt to
perpetrate a felony of any degree of rape, sodomy, burglary, robbery, kidnapping, or any felony offense in
chapter 195, RSMo.”).
88
V.A.M.S. § 565.032.2(12) (“The murdered individual was a witness or potential witness in any
past or pending investigation or past or pending prosecution, and was killed as a result of his status as a
witness or potential witness.”).
89
V.A.M.S. § 565.032.2(13) (“The murdered individual was an employee of an institution or facility
of the department of corrections of this state or local correction agency and was killed in the course of
performing his official duties, or the murdered individual was an inmate of such institution or facility.”).
90
V.A.M.S. § 565.032.2(14) (“The murdered individual was killed as a result of the hijacking of an
airplane, train, ship, bus or other public conveyance.”).
91
V.A.M.S. § 565.032.2(15) (“The murder was committed for the purpose of concealing or
attempting to conceal any felony offense defined in chapter 195, RSMo.”).
92
V.A.M.S. § 565.032.2(16) (“The murder was committed for the purpose of causing or attempting
to cause a person to refrain from initiating or aiding in the prosecution of a felony offense defined in
chapter 195, RSMo.”).
93
V.A.M.S. § 565.032.2(17) (“The murder was committed during the commission of a crime which
is part of a pattern of criminal street gang activity as defined in section 578.421.”).
94
The only jurisdictions with a larger number of aggravators are: California (28 aggravators), Cal.
Penal Code ' 190.2(a); Delaware (22 aggravators), 11 Del.Code. ' 4209(e); Illinois (21 aggravators), 720 Ill.
Cons. Stats. 5/9-1(b); Utah (19 aggravators), Utah Code Ann. 1953 ' 76-5-202 (1); Colorado (18
aggravators), Colo. Rev. Stats. Ann. ' 18-13-1201(5); Oregon (18 aggravators) Ore. Rev. Stats. ' 163.095(12); and Pennsylvania (18 aggravators), 42 Pa.Cons. Stats. Ann. ' 9711(d). With 17 aggravators, Missouri is
tied with Florida, West's Fla. Stats. Ann. ' 921.141(5), in eighth place among the 38 death penalty states.
For
the
42
federal
offenses
which
may
trigger
the
death
penalty,
see
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=29&did=192.
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In Missouri, the crime of voluntary manslaughter is defined as causing the death
of another person under circumstances that would constitute murder, except that the death
was caused "under the influence of sudden passion arising from adequate cause.” 95
“Sudden passion” is defined as "passion directly caused by and arising out of provocation
by the victim or another acting with the victim, which passion arises at the time of the
offense and is not solely the result of former provocation.”96 The offense must have been
committed in sudden passion, and not after there has been time for the passion to cool. 97
“Adequate cause” is “cause that would reasonably produce a degree of passion in
a person of ordinary temperament sufficient to substantially impair an ordinary person's
capacity for self-control.” 98 To be "adequate," the provocation must be of a nature
calculated to inflame the passions of the ordinary, reasonably temperate person. There
must be a sudden, unexpected encounter or provocation tending to excite the passion
beyond control. Passion may be rage, anger, 99 or terror, but it must be so extreme that the
action is being directed by passion, not reason. 100

Words alone, no matter how

opprobrious or insulting, are not sufficient to show adequate provocation. 101
Over the past few decades, many states, influenced by the Model Penal Code,
have broadened the category of homicides that qualify as voluntary manslaughter. 102 In
Missouri, though, the traditional common law rules still apply. Consequently, some
homicides that would be classified as voluntary manslaughter in states influenced by the
95

V.A.M.S. ' 565.023; State v. Redmond, 937 S.W.2d 205, 207 (Mo. 1996).
V.A.M.S.' 565.002(7).
97
State v. Fears, 803 S.W.2d 605, 609 (Mo. 1991). In states that follow the Model Penal Code, there
is no “cooling time” restriction. Hence, even in cases where there has been a substantial lapse of time
between the provocation and the killing, a defendant may still be eligible for a voluntary manslaughter
instruction. See MPC ' 210.3(1)(b). See also MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE
375-76 (2002); People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d l3l0, 1314 (NY l980).
98
V.A.M.S.' 565.002(1).
99
State v. Blackman, 875 S.W.2d 122 (Mo.App.1994).
100
State v. Fears, 803 S.W.2d 605, 609 (Mo. 1991).
101
State v. Redmond, 937 S.W.2d at 208; State v. Starr, 38 Mo. 270, 277 (1866). Beginning with
Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212 (1862), some states began departing from the common law tenet that “mere
words” could never amount to adequate provocation. See also Commonwealth v. Berry, 336 A.2d 262 (Pa.
l975); People v. Valentine, l69 P.2d l, ll-l5 (Ca. l946). Cf. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 708-09 (3d
ed. 2000).
102
Model Penal Code § 210.3(1)(b) classifies as manslaughter a “homicide which would otherwise be
murder” when “committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there
is reasonable explanation or excuse.” At least 14 states have adopted this definition, which does not
require provocation, may be triggered by “mere words” and is not necessarily invalidated by “cooling
time.” SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 418-19 (7th
Ed. 2001).
96
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Model Penal Code are classified as murder in Missouri. Insofar as Missouri law narrows
the class of defendants who are eligible to have their offense reduced from murder to
voluntary manslaughter, the law expands the class of death-eligible defendants, thereby
broadening the scope of prosecutorial discretion in choosing which cases merit capital
punishment.
D.

Inadmissibility of Intoxication Evidence

In Missouri, evidentiary rules related to intoxication also have the effect of
broadening the class of death-eligible offenses. The majority of jurisdictions in the U.S.
allow evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate the “premeditation and deliberation”
required to constitute first-degree murder, and even the intent to kill necessary for a
finding of murder in the second-degree. 103 In contrast, Missouri law makes evidence of
voluntary intoxication inadmissible in the jury’s determination of the defendant’s mental
state. 104 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that a similar Montana statute does
not violate due process, 105 the law does reduce the types of evidence a Missouri jury may
consider in determining whether to find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder.
Thus, homicides committed by intoxicated defendants, which might yield a verdict of
second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter in other states, might well yield a
conviction for first degree murder in Missouri, thereby making the crime potentially
death eligible. 106

Thus, the legislative decision to exclude evidence of voluntary

intoxication effectively broadens the scope of prosecutorial discretion in choosing which
crimes merit capital punishment.
E.

Proportionality Review

For each death sentence that reaches the Missouri Supreme Court on direct
review, the Court is required to determine whether “the sentence of death is excessive or
103

Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401 (1870); People v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 374 (Cal. 1969)
Commonwealth v. Graves, 334 A.2d 661, 662-63 (Pa. 1975); Terry v. State, 465 N.E.2d 1085, 1087-88
(Ind. 1984); Cal. Penal Code ' 22 (1). See generally, LAFAVE, supra note __, at 412-16.
104
VAMS ' 562.076(3) provides: “Evidence that a person was in a voluntarily intoxicated or drugged
condition may be admissible when otherwise relevant on issues of conduct but in no event shall it be
admissible for the purpose of negating a mental state which is an element of the offense.”
105
Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996).
106
There are approximately ten other states that, like Missouri, preclude defendants from introducing
evidence of voluntary intoxication. See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW
AND ITS PROCESSES 870 (7th Ed. 2001). See LAFAVE, supra note __, at 414.
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disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime, the
strength of the evidence and the defendant.” 107

For the purpose of facilitating this

review, the statute provides for an “assistant to the Supreme Court” who shall accumulate
“the records of all cases in which the sentence of death or life imprisonment without
probation or parole was imposed” and “provide the court with whatever extracted
information the court desires with respect thereto,” in order to assess proportionality. 108
Missouri’s proportionality statute mirrors that of the State of Georgia. 109 In the
wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Gregg v. Georgia, 110 Missouri was one of
twenty-six states that adopted a requirement of proportionality review modeled on the
Georgia statute. 111 After the U.S. Supreme Court decided that proportionality review was
not required by the Eight Amendment, 112 nine states repealed their proportionality review
statutes, and several others abandoned the practice. 113 At present, twenty of the 38 states
that allow capital punishment maintain a statutory requirement for proportionality
review. 114
In conducting proportionality review, the Missouri Supreme Court considers all
cases in which a capital charge was submitted to the jury, but does not consider other

107

V.A.M.S. ' 565.035(3)(3).
V.A.M.S. ' 565.035(6).
109
Under the Georgia scheme, the Supreme Court is required in every case to determine “[w]hether
the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering
both the crime and the defendant.” Ga.Code Ann. ' 17-10-35(c)(3) (1982). If the court affirms the death
sentence, it is to include in its decision reference to similar cases that it has taken into consideration. '
17-10-35(e). The court is required to maintain records of all capital felony cases in which the death penalty
was imposed since 1970. ' 17-10-3.
110
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
111
Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn, Capital Punishment, Proportionality Review, and Claims of
Fairness (with Lessons from Washington State), 79 WASH. L. REV. 775, 790 (2004).
112
Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1984).
113
Kaufman-Osborn, supra note __, at 791-96. For a list of the states that no longer conduct
proportionality review, see State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 663 (Tenn.1997).
114
Ala. Code '13A-5-53(b)(3) (1994); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, '4209(g)(2)(a) (1995); Ga. Code Ann.
'17-10-35(c)(3) (1997); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. '532.075(3)(c) (Michie 1999); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
905.9.1(1)(c) (West 1997); Miss. Code Ann. '99-19-105(3)(c) (1999); Mo. Ann. Stat. '565.035.3(3) (West
1999); Mont. Code Ann. '46-18-310(1)(c) (1999); Neb. Rev. Stat. '29-2521.03 (1995); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. '630:5(XI)(c) (1996); N.J. Stat. Ann. '2C:11-3(e) (West 1995); N.M. Stat. Ann. '31-20A-4(C)(4)
(Michie 2000); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law '470.30(3)(b) (McKinney Supp. 2001); N.C. Gen. Stat. '
15A-2000(d)(2) (1999); Ohio Rev. Code. Ann. '2929.05(A) (Anderson 1999); S.C. Code Ann.
'16-3-25(c)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. Codified Laws ' 23A-27A-12(3) (Michie 1998); Tenn. Code Ann.
'39-13-206(c)(1)(D) (1997); Va. Code Ann. '17.1-313(c)(2) (Michie 1999); and Wash. Rev. Code
'10.95.130(2)(b) (1990).
108
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death-eligible cases. 115 The issue for the Court is not whether the death sentence is
appropriate for the particular individual, but whether any defendant in similar
circumstances should be eligible for the death sentence.116 Only when the case, taken as
a whole, is plainly lacking circumstances consistent with those in similar cases where a
death penalty has been imposed will resentencing be ordered by the Supreme Court. 117 If
there are no prior similar cases on record, the Supreme Court will make an independent
judgment as to whether the imposition of the death sentence is wanton or freakish under
the facts of the case. 118 Accomplices' plea agreements and convictions for crimes other
than first degree murder are not considered in proportionality review of a death
sentence. 119
In theory, the statutory requirement for proportionality review is designed to
narrow the class of death-eligible offenses and narrow the scope of prosecutorial
discretion. In practice, though, proportionality review does not actually have that effect
because the Missouri Supreme Court’s review is largely perfunctory.

In fact, the

Missouri Supreme Court has reversed only one death sentence as “disproportionate.” 120
In a second case, the Court exercised its capital sentencing review authority to set aside a
death sentence based on a combination of comparative weakness of evidence and
favorable evidence of the defendant's background. 121

Missouri’s record of

proportionality review is fairly typical. Of the state high court decisions in capital cases
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State v. Lashley, 667 S.W.2d 712, 716 (Mo.1984); State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1, 10B11 (year)
(cited in ROBERT H. DIERKER, 32 MO. PRAC., MISSOURI CRIMINAL LAW § 57.10 (2d ed. 2007)
HTTP://WEB2.WESTLAW.COM/SEARCH/DEFAULT.WL?RS=WLW7.02&FN=_TOP&SV=SPLIT&DB=MOPRACCRIMLIT&VR=2.0&RP=%2FSEARCH%2FDEFAULT.WL&MT=LAWSCHOOLPRACTITIONER.
Missouri’s
approach to proportionality review is followed by seven other states, which also review cases that go to a
penalty hearing along with those that result in a capital judgment. Eight states take the narrower approach
and only consider death judgments. Finally, three states consider all death-eligible cases.
116
See State ex rel. Davis v. Shinn, 874 S.W.2d 403 (Mo.App.1994).
117
State v. Nunley, 923 S.W.2d 911 (Mo.1996).
118
State v. Ramsey, 864 S.W.2d 320 (Mo.1993).
119
State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511 (Mo.2003).
120
State v. McIlvoy, 629 S.W.2d 333 (Mo.1982). In that case, the Court appears to have been
strongly influenced by the defendant's conduct in voluntarily surrendering to authorities. DIERKER, supra
note __, ' 57.10.
121
State v. Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47 (Mo.1998). The Court concentrated for the first time on the
“strength of the evidence” and went beyond its mere sufficiency. DIERKER, supra note __.
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rendered between 1975 and April 1996, only fifty-five death sentences were vacated on
the ground of disproportionality, while 1376 death sentences were affirmed. 122
IV.
Methodology and Research Design
This study focuses on prosecutorial discretion in the implementation of capital
punishment in Missouri. Specifically, the main objectives are: (a) to analyze correlations
between prosecutorial discretion and disparate impacts on different racial and geographic
groups within Missouri; and (b) to determine the extent to which statutory limitations
constrain the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and promote consistent application of
capital punishment across counties.
A.

Overview of Two Databases

We began the study by creating a “large database” that includes substantially all
of the intentional homicide cases prosecuted in Missouri over a five-year period.
Specifically, the large database includes 1046 cases, all of which satisfy the following
criteria: (1) the initial indictment or information is dated between Jan. 1, 1997 and Dec.
31, 2001; (2) the defendant was initially charged with either murder or voluntary
manslaughter; 123 and (3) the defendant was ultimately convicted of a homicide offense.
For cases in the large database, we collected a very limited set of information that could
be obtained from publicly available court documents. For the purposes of analysis, we
divided the cases in the large database into two categories: “capital charges” and “noncapital cases.” “Capital charges” are cases in which the prosecutor sought the death
penalty at some point during the prosecution. For example, cases in which the prosecutor
initially charged death, and then later accepted a plea bargain for a lesser sentence, count
as capital charges for these purposes. All other cases in the large database are “noncapital cases.”
122

Kaufman-Osborn, supra note __, at 792 (citing Donald H. Wallace & Jonathan R. Sorenson,
Comparative Proportionality Review: A Nationwide Examination of Reversed Death Sentences, 22 Am. J.
Crim. Just. 13, 35 (1997).
123
Although cases charged as second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter are not death-eligible
under the statute, these cases are included because prosecutorial discretion affects the decision whether to
charge a case as first-degree murder (M1), second-degree murder (M2), or voluntary manslaughter (VM).
The analysis in Part V, infra, demonstrates that many of the cases charged as M2 or VM satisfy the
statutory requirements for an M1 charge, and are death-eligible under the statute.
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After compiling the large database, we selected a “small sample” of cases to study
in greater detail. The initial small sample included 129 capital charges, 124 plus 130 noncapital cases that were selected at random from the large database, for a total initial
sample size of 259 cases. Because the goal was to perform detailed analysis of cases in
the small sample, we ultimately eliminated 18 defendants from the small sample about
whom we were unable to obtain sufficient information, including 8 capital charges and 10
non-capital cases. We also added six more capital charges that we discovered after the
initial creation of the small sample. Hence, the final small sample consists of 247 cases,
including 127 capital charges and 120 non-capital cases.
B.

Creation of the Large Database

Data in the large database is derived almost exclusively from records contained in
county courthouses. There are 115 counties in Missouri, each with its own courthouse,
its own records, and its own record-keeping system. Most of the collection of court
documents for creation of the large database was completed in 2003. At that time, many
county courthouses were not computerized and most of the counties that did maintain
electronic records did not have an ability to search their databases electronically to
identify all of the homicide cases in a given time period.
We relied primarily on a list provided by the Office of State Courts Administrator
(OSCA) to identify cases for inclusion in the large database. 125 In fall 2002, OSCA
provided us a list of all the cases in Missouri with an initial charging date between Jan. 1,
1997 and Dec. 31, 2001 where the defendant was charged with either murder or voluntary
manslaughter and the defendant was convicted of a homicide offense. OSCA refused to
provide information about cases that were dismissed, or that resulted in non-guilty

124

The final large database includes 133 capital charges. However, data collection for the large
database was incomplete at the time the small sample was created. At that time, we had identified only 129
cases as capital charges. All 129 cases that were identified as capital charges at that time were initially
included in the small sample.
125
In 1994, the Missouri legislature appropriated funds to develop a statewide court automation
system. See V.A.M.S. § 476.055. Missouri Supreme Court Rules provide that the “office of state courts
administrator will operate the court automation central computer sites.” Rule 1.03. Supreme Court Rules
also require all state courts to “report case information to the Office of State Courts Administrator.” Rule
4.28. Thus, insofar as state courts comply with their reporting obligations, and insofar as OSCA manages
the court automation system effectively, OSCA should have records of all the criminal cases prosecuted in
Missouri since about the mid-1990s.
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verdicts, because that information is confidential.126 We verified and augmented the
OSCA list by asking county clerks to double-check the information provided by OSCA.
Most of the clerks said that they had no way of knowing whether the OSCA information
was complete. A few clerks identified some cases that met our parameters that had been
inadvertently omitted from the OSCA list. Thus, it is likely that the large database
excludes a small number of intentional homicide cases within the time frame of this study
that were inadvertently omitted from the OSCA list, and that county clerks were unable
to identify. Even so, we are confident that the large database contains the vast majority
of cases that satisfy our criteria for inclusion in the database. 127
After obtaining the list of cases from OSCA, we sent law students to county
courthouses to review courthouse records. The goal was to obtain a limited set of
information about every case in the large database.128 To obtain the relevant information,
we created a data collection form, a copy of which is reproduced in Annex A. We also
126

OSCA also refused to provide the names of defendants; all cases were identified only by case
numbers. Every case that involved a change of venue was double-counted. If venue changed twice, the
case was triple-counted. Thus, in the early stages, we devoted substantial effort to eliminating double and
triple counting problems.
127
There are several factors that support this conclusion. First, OSCA has a statutory mandate to
collect information about all the criminal cases prosecuted in Missouri. See supra note __. County clerks
report relevant information to OSCA on a regular basis. OSCA has established procedures for recording
the information obtained from county clerks in its database. Undoubtedly, there are data entry and other
errors that affect the accuracy of OSCA’s data. However, OSCA’s procedures provide safeguards to
minimize such errors.
One county that has an exceptionally good computerized case management system is Pulaski
County. In the early phases of data collection, we were able to check the accuracy and completeness of the
OSCA data for Pulaski County by comparing the OSCA data to Pulaski’s own data. (The clerk in Pulaski
County had records of about 25 cases, most of which were transferred to Pulaski on change of venue
motions. The cases that originated in other counties do not count as “Pulaski cases” in our final tabulation.)
This process revealed that cases charged as “capital murder,” rather than “first-degree murder,” were
inadvertently omitted from the data initially provided by OSCA. OSCA then corrected that omission by
providing an additional list of cases charged as “capital murder.” In the end, we identified only ten cases
that were omitted from the final OSCA list, suggesting that the list was substantially complete.
128
For every case in the large database, we collected copies of the following documents: a docket
sheet (if available); the initial indictment or information; any amended indictment or information; the
sentence and judgment form; the plea agreement (if the case resulted in a guilty plea); the verdict form (if
the case went to trial); and the notice of aggravating circumstances (for cases where the prosecutor sought
death). For cases initially charged as M2 or VM, students merely reviewed enough of the file to confirm
that there was no M1 charge, collect the relevant documents, and complete the data collection form. For
cases initially charged as M1, students reviewed the entire file to determine whether there was any evidence
that the prosecutor sought the death penalty at any time during the process. In addition to the documents
noted above, they collected additional documentation that provided evidence that the prosecutor did, or did
not, seek the death penalty (e.g., pre-trial motions opposing capital punishment, jury instructions, etc.) The
information recorded on the data collection forms was entered into an electronic database; that is the large
database.
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prepared detailed instructions for students about how to complete the data collection
form. Ultimately, students visited 83 of the 115 county courthouses in Missouri. There
were nine counties that did not have any murder or voluntary manslaughter cases in the
time frame under study. There were also 23 counties that had one or two M2 or VM
cases, but no M1 cases. County clerks sent us documentation for the cases from those
counties, but students did not visit the courthouses to review records. 129
Problems of Inclusion and Exclusion: We included cases on the basis of initial
charging date (rather than, for example, disposition dates or crime dates). Specifically,
we included cases where the first indictment or information was filed between January 1,
1997 and December 31, 2001. 130 Cases charged before Dec. 31, 2001 are included even
if there was no final disposition until several years later.131 Cases initially charged as
murder or voluntary manslaughter are included, even if the defendant was ultimately
convicted of a lesser offense, such as involuntary manslaughter. Cases in which charges
were dismissed, and those that resulted in not guilty verdicts, are excluded from the
database, both because the individuals were not demonstrably guilty, and because the
records are not publicly available. 132
Counting Issues: For the purpose of counting cases, the unit of analysis is a
“defendant-crime,” except as provided below. Because we focus on the initial charging
decisions of prosecutors, a single initial charging decision by a specific prosecutor
against a single defendant for a specific crime generally counts as one case. Consistent
129

The primary reason for sending students to visit county courthouses was so that students could
review the entire file for every case initially charged as M1 to obtain documentation necessary to determine
whether a case should be classified as a “capital charge.” For cases initially charged as M2 or VM, there
was no need to review the entire file because those cases are all “non-capital cases.” Therefore, if a county
did not report any M1 cases, there was no need for students to visit the courthouse.
130
There are 15 cases included in the large database where the initial indictment or information was
filed before January 1, 1997, the defendant’s conviction was reversed on appeal, and prosecutors filed a
writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to initiate a new prosecution between January 1, 1997 and
December 31, 2001. The rationale for including these cases is that we are studying prosecutorial charging
decisions in a given time frame. Because the decision to file a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is
essentially a new charging decision, we count the filing of such a writ as the initiation of a new case if it is
filed within our time frame.
131
In September 2006, we deleted four cases from the large database that had still not reached a final
disposition. In one such case, the attorneys were still debating whether the defendant was competent to
stand trial. In another case, the defendant absconded and was never found. At the same time, we also
deleted two cases where the clerk was never able to locate the file.
132
Because we are investigating the charging decisions of prosecutors, excluding the subset of
defendants who are found not guilty could potentially introduce some bias in our estimates. Having been
found not guilty suggests that the prosecutor’s charging decision was more aggressive in these cases.
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with this counting rubric, if a prosecution was initiated in County X and there was a
change of venue to County Y, we count that as one case (one initial charge), not two
cases. 133 If two or more co-defendants were charged with the same crime, we count the
case against each co-defendant as a separate case. If one defendant committed a series of
homicides in separate incidents, each incident is counted separately. If one defendant
was charged with multiple homicides in a single incident, we count that as one case.
There are a few cases in which the defendant was charged with murder in an indictment
filed after Jan. 1, 1997, the defendant’s conviction was reversed on appeal, and the
prosecutor filed a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum before Dec. 31, 2001. These
cases are counted as two cases because they involve two independent charging decisions
by a prosecutor. 134
Division into Capital Charges and Non-capital Cases: In general, when a
prosecutor in Missouri decides to seek the death penalty, he or she files a “notice of
aggravating circumstances.” For our purposes, every case in which the prosecutor filed a
notice of aggravating circumstances counts as a capital charge, even if the prosecutor
later agreed to a plea bargain that provided for a lesser sentence. Moreover, a case counts
as a capital charge if the defendant pled guilty to first-degree murder and accepted a
sentence of life without parole, even if there was no notice of aggravating circumstances
in the file. 135 Additionally, there are a few cases in the database for which there was no
notice of aggravating circumstances in the file, but there was other documentation
indicating that the prosecutor sought the death penalty.

Examples of such other

documentation include entries on docket sheets, jury instructions, and defense motions to
133

Under Missouri law, in every criminal case triable by a jury, the defendant is entitled to an
automatic change of venue if the initial charges are filed in a county with a population less than 75,000.
Mo. Sup. Ct. Rules of Crim. Proc., Rule 32.03(a). Thus, most of the cases initiated in small counties were
transferred to other counties before trial. Overall 161 out of 1046 cases in the large database changed
venue at least once.
134
The large database includes 8 cases that are “double-counted” in this way. There is no optimal
way to deal with these cases. They are not two truly independent cases. However, if these cases were
treated as one case, it would present a problem whether to count the initial decision or a subsequent
decision. For example, if the death penalty was originally sought, but not sought in the second trial, did the
defendant face a death trial? Our decision to treat the cases as two separate cases is also consistent with our
treatment of other cases involving separate trials outside our time period.
135
We assume that a defendant would not plead guilty to first-degree murder and accept a sentence of
life without parole unless the prosecution had at least threatened to seek the death penalty. However, in
three cases where defendant pled guilty to first-degree murder and accepted a sentence of life without
parole, there is affirmative evidence that the prosecution did not seek the death penalty. Those cases are
not counted as capital charges.
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preclude the application of capital punishment. A case counts as a capital charge if such
other documentation shows clearly that the prosecutor sought capital punishment at some
time during the process. 136
C. Creation of the Small Sample
As noted above, the final small sample includes 247 cases.

We sought

information about these cases from six different sources: 1) the court records that had
been collected for creation of the large database; 2) a web-based database called
“Case.net”, which provides access to the Missouri State Courts Automated Case
Management System; 137 3) published appellate opinions; 4) newspaper articles; 5)
criminal history record information (CHRI) obtained from the FBI; and 6) police reports
obtained from the state and local law enforcement agencies that investigated the
homicides.
For the vast majority of cases in the small sample, the police reports provide the
most detailed factual information about the case. There were two reasons why we
decided to rely primarily on police reports, rather than trial transcripts, to obtain detailed
factual information about the cases. First, and most importantly, relying solely on those
cases that went to trial would introduce significant bias in the sample, since fewer than
half of the cases in the small sample actually went to trial. 138 Second, we were operating
on a limited budget, and it was less expensive to collect police reports for all the small
sample cases than it would have been to obtain trial transcripts for the sub-set of cases
that went to trial.
Collection of police reports was generally a two-step process. First, we contacted
county prosecutors to find out which law enforcement agency maintained the
investigative file for each case. (Some files are held by county sheriffs, some by city
police departments, and some by the Missouri State Highway Patrol.)

Second, we

contacted the law enforcement agencies directly to obtain copies of the investigative
136

The final small sample includes 127 capital charges. Our files contain a notice of aggravating
circumstances for 108 of those cases.
137
Case.net data is available at http://www.courts.mo.gov/casenet/base/welcome.do. Case.net does
not provide information about the underlying facts of homicide cases, but it does provide basic information
about the judicial process, such as charging and sentencing information. To access information on
Case.net, one must have a case number or the defendant’s name (or both).
138
The final small sample of 247 cases includes 137 cases resolved by guilty pleas, 17 cases decided
by bench trials, and 93 cases decided by jury trials.
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reports. 139 Cooperation from prosecutors and law enforcement officials was uneven.
Some were eager to provide the requested information. Others were reluctant to do so,
despite the fact that police investigative reports are classified as public records under the
Missouri Sunshine Act after a case becomes “inactive.” 140
We were unable to collect police reports for some cases that remained “active” as
of fall 2006, when we halted data collection efforts. We were also unable to collect
police reports for some inactive cases because the relevant public officials refused to
provide the requested information. 141 Ultimately, we eliminated 17 cases from the small
sample due to inadequate information, resulting in a final sample of 247 cases. 142 We
successfully obtained police reports for most of those 247 cases. The final small sample
includes 48 defendants for whom we never obtained police reports; we retained those
cases because we were able to obtain sufficient information from appellate opinions and
other sources to merit inclusion in the small sample.
We created two different data entry forms for the small sample cases. The main
data entry form is a 13-page form. We provided a detailed set of written instructions to
assist students in completing the form. For each case in the small sample, a law student
reviewed the police reports, court documents and appellate opinions, and completed the
data entry form on that basis. If the review of those documents left key questions
unanswered, students used Case.net to provide supplemental information about the
judicial process, and newspaper articles to provide supplemental information about the
underlying facts.

After students completed the data entry forms, a law professor

139

The level of detail contained in police investigative reports varies widely. Some reports consist of
hundreds of pages of documentation. Others include only about a dozen pages. There is no standard
format for these reports and there do not appear to be any guidelines specifying the type of information to
be included.
140
The Sunshine Act distinguishes among “arrest reports,” “incident reports,” and “investigative
reports.” V.A.M.S. § 610.100.1. All incident reports and arrest reports are public records. V.A.M.S. §
610.100.2. However, to obtain detailed factual information about a case, it is necessary to procure the
investigative report. Investigative reports are initially closed; they become open records once an
investigation is no longer active. Guyer v. City of Kirkwood, 38 S.W.3d 412 (MO banc, 2001). An
investigation is active until “the convictions of all persons convicted on the basis of the information
contained in the investigative report” are final, either “by exhaustion of or expiration of all rights of appeal
of such persons.” V.A.M.S. § 610.100.1(3)(c).
141
In other states, where researchers have been given a legislative mandate to conduct similar studies,
it appears that public officials have been very forthcoming in providing researchers all available data.
Obviously, the refusal of some Missouri officials to provide requested information affects the reliability of
conclusions that can be drawn on the basis of the data collected.
142
See supra note __ and accompanying text.
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reviewed the forms and raised questions about issues that were unclear.

Students

modified the forms on that basis. Then, after the revisions were complete, other research
assistants entered the data from those forms into an electronic database. This data was
linked with the criminal history records of defendants, provided by the FBI.
We created a separate data entry form for the small sample cases to provide
specific information about aggravating circumstances.
statute has seventeen aggravating circumstances. 143

The Missouri death penalty

The “aggravator form” lists the

seventeen statutory aggravators. Law students reviewed the case files and completed one
aggravator form for each case in the small sample. For every case, students provided one
of three possible answers for each aggravator: 1) the prosecutor actually charged this
aggravator; 2) the prosecutor could have charged this aggravator, but did not; or 3) there
is insufficient evidence to support this aggravator. 144 Before students completed any of
the aggravator forms, one student reviewed Missouri Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the aggravating factors and provided a summary of relevant case law that
served as guidance for the students who completed the aggravator forms. Students
completed aggravator forms for the capital charges before they completed forms for the
non-capital cases. Once they completed review of the capital charges, we used that
information to summarize the actual charging practices of prosecutors in cases where
prosecutors charged aggravators. The summary of charging practices provided additional
guidance to students in evaluating which aggravators prosecutors “could have charged”
in the non-capital cases.
Students provided a narrative summary of each case at the end of the aggravator
form. A law professor reviewed every aggravator form for completeness and accuracy by
comparing the entries for individual aggravators to the summary at the end of the form.
For two of the seventeen statutory aggravators, the process involved one additional step.
The “prior record” aggravator relates to the defendant’s prior criminal record. A law
professor modified the student responses for that aggravator based upon a review of the
criminal history record information (CHRI) that we obtained from the FBI.

The

“wantonly vile” aggravator is the broadest and vaguest statutory aggravating factor; it
143

V.A.M.S. § 565.032.
A prosecutor “could have charged” an aggravator if he or she could make a good faith, reasonable
argument in support of a decision to charge that aggravator in a particular case.

144
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applies to any murder that “was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in
that it involved torture, or depravity of mind.” 145 For every case in which prosecutors did
not charge that aggravator, a law professor reviewed the narrative summary and made an
independent determination as to whether the prosecutor could have charged the
“wantonly vile” aggravator in that case. Once this analysis was completed, all of the data
from the aggravator forms was electronically recorded.
D.

Analytical Methodology

The analysis in the remainder of this paper is divided into three parts. Part V
measures the extent to which statutory constraints limit the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in charging decisions. Part VI provides unadjusted measures of geographic
and racial disparities in the decision-making process that determines which defendants
are convicted of first-degree murder, and which defendants are convicted of lesser
included offenses. (The term “unadjusted measures” means that these measures do not
control for the culpability of individual defendants.)

Part VII provides unadjusted

measures of geographic and racial disparities in the decision-making process that
determines which defendants are sentenced to death.
We define the term “M1-eligible” to mean that a reasonably aggressive prosecutor
could make a good faith, reasonable argument that the statutory requirements for an M1
charge are satisfied. We define the term “death-eligible” to mean that a reasonably
aggressive prosecutor could make a good faith, reasonable argument that the statutory
requirements for a capital charge are satisfied. In Part V, we analyze cases that were
initially charged as M2 or VM to derive an estimate of the percentage of cases in the
large database that are M1-eligible. Similarly, we analyze cases that were not charged as
capital cases to derive an estimate of the percentage of cases in the large database that are
death-eligible. The estimates of the percentage of cases that are M-1 eligible and deatheligible provide a rough quantitative measure of the extent to which statutory constraints
limit the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
The analysis in Part VI examines racial, geographic, and socioeconomic
disparities at different points in the decision tree depicted below. Figure 4.1 provides a
145

V.A.M.S. § 565.032.2(7). The Missouri Supreme Court has adopted an expansive interpretation
of this aggravator, making it potentially applicable to almost every murder. See infra notes ___ and
accompanying text.
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simplified schematic of the process for deciding which defendants who commit
intentional homicide should be convicted of first-degree murder. There are

FIGURE 4.1

basically four steps in that process. First, the legislature eliminates some cases by
deciding that they are not M1-eligible under the statute.
eliminates other cases by deciding not to file M1 charges.

Second, the prosecutor
Third, the prosecutor

eliminates more cases by withdrawing the M1 charge in cases initially charged as M1.
Fourth, the jury (or judge in a bench trial) further narrows the field by convicting the
defendant of a lesser included offense in a case tried as a first-degree murder case. The
cases remaining after these four distinct narrowing functions have been performed are the
M1 convictions.

Part V focuses on the first step in the process: it measures the
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percentage of intentional homicide cases that the statute eliminates from the class of M1eligible offenses.

Part VI examines geographic and racial disparities in the

implementation of the next three steps: prosecutorial charging decisions, plea bargaining
decisions, and trial decisions by the factfinders.
Part VII examines geographic and racial disparities at different points in the
decision tree depicted below. Figure 4.2 provides a simplified schematic of the process
for deciding which defendants who commit intentional homicide should be sentenced to
death. First, the legislature eliminates some cases by deciding that they are not deatheligible under the statute. Second, the prosecutor eliminates other cases by deciding not
to file capital charges. Third, the prosecutor eliminates more cases by accepting plea
agreements for non-death sentences in cases initially charged as capital cases. Fourth, the
jury (or judge in a bench trial) further narrows the field by convicting the defendant of
M2 or VM, or by voting for life without parole instead of the death penalty. The cases
remaining after these four distinct narrowing functions have been performed are the death
sentences. Part V focuses on the first step in the process: it measures the percentage of
intentional homicide cases that the statute eliminates from the class of death-eligible
offenses. Part VII examines geographic and racial disparities in the implementation of
the next three steps: prosecutorial charging decisions, plea bargaining decisions, and
decisions at trial by the factfinders.
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FIGURE 4.2

To provide measures of geographic disparities, we analyze the complete universe
of cases in the large database because, for every case in the large database, the database
contains information about the county of origin and the decisions made in each stage of
the decision process depicted above. To provide measures of racial disparities, we derive
estimates from the small sample because information about race of victims and race of
defendants is available only for cases in the small sample. Those estimates are based on
a weighted average that accounts for the sampling method we employed. The small
sample includes all capital charges (probability of inclusion = 100%) and 130 randomly
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selected non-capital cases (14.2% of 915 cases). 146 We weight by the inverse of the
probability of inclusion in the small sample (so called “probability weights”), where
cases are weighted to represent the equivalent number of cases in the universe of cases.
Thus, capital charges are weighted one (each capital charge in the small sample
represents one capital charge in the universe of cases) and non-capital cases are weighted
7.09 (each non-capital case in the small sample represents about 7.09 non-capital cases in
the universe of cases). We also control for the finite size of the universe of cases in
determining standard errors and test statistics. We use the same weighted averaging
method in Parts VI and VII.
V.
Statutory Constraints on Prosecutorial Discretion
This Part measures the extent to which statutory constraints limit the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in charging decisions. Part Five is divided into three sections.
The first section analyzes statutory constraints on prosecutorial discretion to charge a
crime as M1 versus M2.

The second section analyzes constraints on prosecutorial

discretion to file capital charges. The third section evaluates the narrowing effects of
statutory aggravating factors.
A.

First Degree versus Second Degree Murder

We define the term “M1-eligible” to mean that a reasonably aggressive prosecutor
could make a good faith, reasonable argument that the statutory requirements for an M1
charge are satisfied. Using conservative assumptions, we estimate that 62.3 percent of
the cases in the large database that were initially charged as M2 or VM satisfy the
statutory requirements for an M1 charge. Overall, we estimate that 84.5 percent of the
cases in the large database are M1-eligible under the statute. These estimates are derived
as follows.
There are 1046 cases in the large database, including 617 cases initially charged
as M1, and 429 cases initially charged as M2 or VM. We want to know how many of the
429 cases charged as M2 or VM are M1-eligible. To answer this question, it is necessary
146

As noted above, the final small sample includes only 120 non-capital cases because we eliminated
several cases due to inadequate information. See supra notes __ and accompanying text. However, at the
time we initially selected the small sample, we randomly selected 130 non-capital cases from a universe of
915 non-capital cases. We used those figures to determine the proper weighting for a weighted average.
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to extrapolate from the cases in the small sample because we do not have sufficient
information about all the cases in the large database to answer this question for every
case in the large database. There are 247 cases in the small sample, including 61 cases
that were initially charged as either M2 or VM. Law students reviewed the files for all
247 cases and prepared a narrative summary for each case. 147 Once the summaries were
finalized, two law professors independently reviewed the summaries for all 61 cases that
were initially charged as either M2 or VM to determine which cases were M1-eligible.
For each case, each professor answered either “yes” or “no” to the question whether the
case was M1-eligible. There were 38 cases that both professors agreed are M-1 eligible,
and 53 cases that at least one professor thought was M1-eligible. Conservatively, using
only the 38 cases for which both professors agreed, 148 we estimate that 62.3% of the
small sample cases initially charged as M2 or VM are M1-eligible under the statute. 149
Assuming that 100% of the cases in the large database that were initially charged as M1
are M1-eligible under the statute, and assuming that 62.3% of the cases that were initially
charged as M2 or VM are M1-eligible under the statute, we estimate that 84.5% of the
intentional homicide cases prosecuted in Missouri are M1-eligible under the statute.150
Figure 5.1 compares the influence of the statute to the influence of prosecutorial
discretion in determining which cases yield M1 convictions. Given that 84.5% of the
intentional homicide cases prosecuted in Missouri are M1-eligible under the statute, it
follows that the statute eliminates only about 15.5% of the cases from the class of M1eligible offenses. Prosecutors filed M1 charges in only 69.8% of the M1-eligible cases.

147

See supra Part IV.C.
If one uses the higher figure of 53 cases that at least one professor thought were M1-eligible, this
would suggest that 86.9% of the cases initially charged as M2 or VM are M1-eligible.
149
Because we are extrapolating from a sub-sample of data, there is additional error in this estimate.
To be precise, the conservative estimate is that 62% ± 12% are M1-eligible.
150
(1.00 x 617) + (.623 x 429) = .845 x 1046. Incorporating the error in the original 62.3% estimate,
our conservative estimate is that 84.5% ± 5.8% of the cases in the large database are M1-eligible. If one
used the more liberal estimate that 53 out of 61 M2/VM cases in the small sample are M1-eligible, a similar
calculation yields the estimate that about 94.6 percent of the cases in the large database are M1-eligible.
148
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FIGURE 5.1

In effect, this means that prosecutors eliminated 30.2% of the M1-eligible cases by
choosing not to file an M1 charge. Moreover, prosecutors eliminated 47.8% of the cases
initially charged as M1 by voluntarily reducing the M1 charge. 151 Overall, discretionary
choices by prosecutors eliminated about 53.7% of the intentional homicide cases from the
M1 category, 152 whereas the statute eliminated only about 15.5% of the cases from the
M1 category. Thus, prosecutors do about 3.5 times more “work” than the statute in
narrowing the class of intentional homicide cases to yield M1 convictions.

151

The vast majority of cases in which prosecutors withdrew M1 charges were resolved by guilty
pleas. Indeed, 284 out of 295 cases in this group were resolved by guilty pleas. The other 11 cases in this
category are cases where the prosecutor filed an amended information before trial to reduce the charge
from M1 to M2.
152
(267+295)/1046 = .537
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It bears emphasis that the minimum penalty for an M1 conviction is harsher than
the maximum penalty for an M2 conviction. The statute provides only two possible
sentences for a defendant convicted of M1: death, or life without parole (LWOP). 153 In
contrast, the maximum penalty for a defendant convicted of M2 is life with parole, and
the minimum penalty is ten years imprisonment. 154 Of the 1046 cases in the large
database, 241 defendants were convicted of M1 and 805 defendants were convicted of
lesser included offenses. 155 The 241 M1 convictions yielded 26 death sentences and 215
LWOP sentences. In contrast, the 805 cases where defendants were convicted of lesser
included offenses yielded 151 life sentences and 651 fixed term sentences. 156

The

average sentence for defendants sentenced to a term of years was 15.79 years.
In sum, there is a huge difference in sentencing outcomes between defendants
convicted of M1 and defendants convicted of lesser included offenses. But despite that
difference, the statute gives prosecutors extremely broad discretion to choose which
defendants should be convicted of M1, and which defendants should be convicted of
lesser offenses.

Thus, the Missouri statute effectively delegates to prosecutors the

legislative task of determining which types of homicides merit harsher punishment.
The Missouri legislature could amend the statutory definition of “deliberation” to
require evidence of advance planning or a preconceived design; this is the approach
adopted by California, Arizona, West Virginia and other states. 157 We estimate that only
15% of the cases initially charged as M2 or VM would be M1-eligible under the revised
statute (compared to at least 62.3% under the existing statute), and about 60% of the
cases initially charged as M1 would remain M1 eligible. Overall, we estimate that only
36% of the cases in the large database, would be M1-eligible under the revised statute
(compared to at least 84.5% under the current statute).158 Hence, this type of statutory
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V.A.M.S. § 565.020(2).
See V.A.M.S. §§ 565.021(2), 558.011(1)(1).
155
This figure includes 542 M2 convictions, 138 voluntary manslaughter convictions, and 125
convictions for other offenses, most of which were involuntary manslaughter.
156
The large database includes three cases where defendants were convicted of M2, but we lack
information about sentencing outcomes.
157
See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
158
These estimates are derived as follows. A law professor reviewed the narrative summaries for
every case in the small sample. For each case, he answered “yes” or “no” to the question whether a
reasonably aggressive prosecutor could make a good faith charge of M1 under a California-type statute.
We divided the results into three categories: cases charged as M1 capital charges, cases charged as M1 non154
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amendment would significantly constrain prosecutorial discretion in choosing which
cases to charge as M1 and which cases to charge as M2.
B.

Prosecutorial Discretion and the Choice Between Life and Death

The small sample contains a total of 247 cases; under the most liberal
assumptions, the small sample includes 239 cases that are M1-eligible. 159 Those 239
cases include 127 capital charges and 112 non-capital cases. Our analysis of aggravating
factors shows that one or more statutory aggravating factors are present in 99 of the 112
M1-eligible cases that were not charged as capital cases. (An aggravator is present in a
case if the prosecutor actually charged that aggravator, or if the prosecutor could make a
good-faith, reasonable decision to charge that aggravator.) Thus, 88.4% of the M1eligible, non-capital cases in the small sample are death-eligible under the statute. This
represents a conservative estimate of the percentage of M1-eligible cases that are deatheligible under the statute.
In Table 5.1, we use this 88.4 percent figure to derive two different estimates of
the percentage of death-eligible cases in the large database. In Part V.A above, we
provided a conservative estimate that 84.5% of the cases in the large database are M1eligible. 160 We also noted the more liberal estimate that as many as 94.6% of the cases
may be M1-eligible. 161 Using the conservative figure, we estimate that approximately
76.2 percent of the intentional homicide cases prosecuted in Missouri are death-eligible
under the statute. If one uses the more liberal figure, this yields an estimate that about
85.2 percent of the intentional homicide cases are death-eligible. 162

capital cases, and cases charged as M2 or VM. We assumed that, for each of these three categories, the
percentage of cases that would be M1-eligible under the revised statute is the same for the large database as
it is for the small sample. Based on that assumption, we estimated the number of large database cases in
each category that would be M1-eligible under the revised statute, and derived an estimate for the large
database as a whole on that basis.
159
As discussed above, two law professors independently analyzed the 61 small sample cases that
were initially charged as M2 or VM to ascertain which ones were not M1-eligible. See supra notes __ and
accompanying text. There were only eight cases that both professors agreed were not M1-eligible. For
present purposes, we assume that those eight cases are not M1-eligible, and all the others are M1-eligible.
Subtracting those eight cases from the total of 247 small sample cases, we assume that the small sample
contains 239 M1-eligible cases.
160
See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
161
See supra note ___.
162
These estimates assume that 100% of the capital charges in the large database are death-eligible
under the statute, and 88.4% of the M1-eligible non-capital cases are death-eligible.
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TABLE 5.1
Conservative Estimate

Liberal Estimate

M1-Eligible Under Statute

84.5%

94.6%

Death Eligible Under Statute

76.2%

85.2%

Figure 5.2 illustrates the process by means of which defendants sentenced to
death are selected from the class of death-eligible defendants.

Here, we use the

conservative estimate that 76.2% of the intentional homicide cases prosecuted in
Missouri are death-eligible under the statute. Figure 5.2 shows that prosecutors filed
capital charges in only 16.7% of the death-eligible cases.

Moreover, prosecutors

withdrew the capital charge in more than 60% of the cases that were initially charged as
capital cases. 163 Overall, only 53 cases resulted in capital trials, 164 and juries returned
death verdicts in 26 cases. In sum, in the process of generating 26 death verdicts out of
1046 cases, the statute eliminated about 24% of the cases from the class of death-eligible
offenses, prosecutors eliminated about 71% of the cases from the pool, 165 and juries
weeded out only 2.6% of the cases. 166

Thus, discretionary choice by individual

prosecutors is the dominant factor shaping decisions about who will live and who will
die. 167

163

Prosecutors withdrew capital charges in 80 of the 133 cases that were initially charged as capital
cases. Those 80 cases include 64 cases resolved by guilty pleas, 11 cases that were tried before a judge
(after the capital charge was withdrawn), and 5 cases that were tried before a jury (after the capital charge
was withdrawn).
164
The 53 capital trials include 4 bench trials and 49 jury trials. The 49 jury trials include 4 cases
where a prosecutor charged death and presented an M1 charge to a jury, but the jury returned a verdict of
M2 or VM. Those cases are counted as “capital trials” even though the cases never reached a penalty
phase. Similarly, the 4 bench trials include 3 cases where a prosecutor charged death and presented an M1
charge to a judge in a bench trial, but the judge returned a verdict of M2. Those cases are also counted as
capital trials even though the cases never reached a penalty phase. Finally, the “capital trial” category
includes one case from Jackson County where the parties agreed to conduct penalty phase proceedings
before a judge, instead of a jury.
165
(664+80)/1046 = .711
166
27/1046 = .258
167
Of course, prosecutors make decisions partly based upon their understanding of how a jury would
react. This fact does not negate the significant amount of discretionary power that prosecutors hold.
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FIGURE 5.2
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C.

The Narrowing Effects of Statutory Aggravating Factors

Table 5.2 estimates the percentage of cases in the large database that are M-1
eligible, but not death-eligible. This figure measures the extent to which the statutory
aggravators narrow the class of death-eligible offenses. Using the conservative estimate
that 84.5% of intentional homicide cases are M1-eligible under the statute, we estimate
that the requirement to prove one or more statutory aggravators eliminates only 8.3
percent of the total cases from the class of death-eligible offenses. If we use the more
liberal estimate that 94.6% of intentional homicide cases are M1-eligible under the
statute, it follows that the requirement to prove a statutory aggravator eliminates about
9.5 percent of the total cases from the class of death-eligible offenses. 168 In light of these
figures, it is doubtful whether the Missouri statute satisfies the constitutional requirement,
articulated in Zant v. Stephens, that aggravating circumstances “must genuinely narrow
the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.” 169

TABLE 5.2
Conservative Estimate

Liberal Estimate

M1-Eligible Under Statute

84.5%

94.6%

M1-Eligible, but Not
Death Eligible

8.3%

9.5%

The failure of Missouri’s statutory aggravators to narrow the class of deatheligible offenses is primarily attributable to two factors.

First, seventeen statutory

aggravating factors is a large number of aggravators. The sheer number of statutory
aggravators tends to broaden the class of death-eligible offenses. Second, there are six
aggravating factors, in particular, that exacerbate this broadening effect: wantonly vile,
felony murder, killing witness, avoiding arrest, for money, and agent/employee. 170 Table
5.3 summarizes the application of Missouri’s statutory aggravating factors.
168

The derivation of the percentages in the first row of Table 5.2 is explained in Part V.A above. See
supra notes __ and accompanying text. In Part V.B, we estimated that 88.4% of the M1-eligible cases are
death eligible. See supra notes __ and accompanying text. The percentages in the bottom row of Table
5.2 are derived by using the percentages in the top row to estimate the number of M1-eligible cases, and
then using the 88.4% figure to estimate the number of death-eligible cases.
169
462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
170
See supra Part III.B for statutory definitions of these aggravators.
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The left-hand column lists the seventeen aggravating factors, ranking them in
terms of the number of cases in which a particular aggravator is present. The next
column shows the number of cases in which prosecutors actually charged a particular
aggravator. Although there are 127 capital charges in the small sample, there are only
108 cases for which we obtained information about the actual charging of aggravators.
The figures in the PAC column reflect the actual usage of aggravators in those 108 cases.
In contrast, the two right-hand columns are based upon our analysis of all 239 M1eligible cases in the small sample. The column labeled “could have charged” indicates
the number of cases in which the prosecutor could make a good faith, reasonable
argument in support of a decision to charge that aggravator, but did not; it therefore does
not include the cases in which the prosecutor actually charged that aggravator. The righthand column shows the percentage of M1-eligible cases in which particular aggravating
factors are present.

TABLE 5.3
APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AGGRAVATING FACTORS
Aggravator

Wantonly Vile
Felony Murder
Killing Witness
Avoiding Arrest
For Money
Agent/Employee
Multiple Homicide
Prior Record
Hazardous Device
Conceal Drug Crime
Escape Custody
Gang Activity
Peace Officer
Public Official
Other Drug Crime
Corrections Officer
Hijacking

Prosecutor
Actually Charged
(PAC) (n = 108)

Prosecutor Could
Have, But Did Not
Charge (CHC)
(n = 239)

Aggravator Present
(PAC + CHC)
(n = 239)

94
67
33
28
51
22
34
30
12
3
5
1
6
3
1
1
0

125
58
86
88
56
76
21
22
21
5
2
5
0
3
4
4
0

219 (91.6%)
125 (52.3%)
119 (49.8%)
116 (48.5%)
107 (44.8%)
98 (41.0%)
55 (23.0%)
52 (21.8%)
33 (13.8%)
8 (3.3%)
7 (2.9%)
6 (2.5%)
6 (2.5%)
6 (2.5%)
5 (2.1%)
5 (2.1%)
0
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The single broadest aggravating factor is the “wantonly vile” aggravator. The
Missouri Supreme Court has construed this factor very broadly. The court has approved
the application of this aggravator in cases involving: multiple injuries to the victim; 171 a
series of attacks directed at the victim; 172 a period of time in which the victim is aware of
his/her impending death; 173 and where a victim was bound prior to the killing. 174 The
court has also approved the application of this aggravator in cases where: the defendant
was motivated by pecuniary gain; 175 the defendant manifested a lack of remorse; 176 the
victim was chosen at random; 177 and the murder was one of a series of murders. 178
Given the broad range of circumstances in which the Missouri Supreme Court has
approved the application of this aggravator, there are very few M1-eligible murders that
do not satisfy the “wantonly vile” aggravator.
Apart from the “wantonly vile” aggravator, the two most frequently charged
aggravators are the “felony murder” and “for money” aggravators, charged in 67 and 51
cases, respectively.

Prosecutors often charge both aggravators in cases where the

defendant commits robbery and/or burglary in conjunction with the murder. 179

The

felony murder aggravator also applies to cases involving rape, sodomy, kidnapping and
certain drug crimes. 180

The “for money” aggravator also applies in murder-for-hire

cases, and in cases where the defendant kills the victim to obtain an inheritance.181 These
two aggravators tend to broaden the class of death-eligible offenses, not because the
171

See, e.g., State v. Strong, 142 S.W.3d 702 (Mo. 2004).
See, e.g., State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1981).
173
See, e.g., State v. Tisius, 92 S.W.3d 751 (Mo. 2002); State v. Brown, 902 S.W.2d. 278 (Mo.
1995); State v. McMillin, 783 S.W.2d 82 (Mo. 1990).
174
See, e.g., State v. Brown, 902 S.W.2d. 278 (Mo. 1995); State v. McMillin, 783 S.W.2d 82 (Mo.
1990).
175
See, e.g., State v. Gill, 167 S.W.3d 184 (Mo. 2005).
176
See, e.g., State v. Griffin, 756 S.W.2d 475, 490 (Mo. 1988); State v. Preston, 673 S.W.2d 1, 11
(Mo. 1984).
177
See, e.g., State v. Clayton, 995 S.W.2d 468 (Mo. 1999); State v. Leisure, 749 S.W.2d 366 (Mo.
1988).
178
See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 79 S.W.3d 420 (Mo. 2002).
179
Prosecutors charged the “felony murder” aggravator in 40 out of 51 cases where they charged the
“for money” aggravator.
180
V.A.M.S. § 565.032.2(11) (“The murder in the first degree was committed while the defendant
was engaged in the perpetration or was aiding or encouraging another person to perpetrate or attempt to
perpetrate a felony of any degree of rape, sodomy, burglary, robbery, kidnapping, or any felony offense in
chapter 195, RSMo.”).
181
See, e.g., State v. Bannister, 680 S.W.2d 141 (Mo. 1984) (murder for hire); State v. Davis, 814
S.W.2d 593 (Mo. 1991) (inheritance).
172
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Supreme Court has construed them broadly, but because the statutory provisions, on their
face, apply to most of the M1-eligible homicides committed in Missouri. In fact, at least
one of the two factors is present in about 60 percent of the M1-eligible cases. 182
Two other statutory aggravating factors – the “killing witness” and “avoiding
arrest” aggravators – are both present in almost fifty percent of the M1-eligible cases. 183
If one examines the statutory language for these two aggravators, it appears that they
address two different types of situations. The “killing witness” aggravator applies to any
case where “the murdered individual was a witness or potential witness in any past or
pending investigation . . . .” 184 The “avoiding arrest” aggravator applies where the
murder “was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a
lawful arrest.” 185 In practice, though, both aggravators apply in virtually the same set of
cases. 186 This is because the Missouri Supreme Court has construed both aggravators to
apply in any case where a defendant kills a victim after the victim has seen the defendant
commit some other crime. Thus, for example, if a defendant robs a victim, and then kills
the victim one minute later, the court says that both aggravators are present because the
victim was a witness to his own robbery, and the defendant killed the victim to avoid
arrest for the robbery. 187
Rounding out the list of the six broadest aggravators, the “agent or employee”
aggravator is present in about 41% of the M1-eligible cases. The Missouri Supreme
Court has upheld the application of this aggravator in murder-for-hire situations, 188 and in

182

The “felony murder” aggravator is present in 52.3% of the cases. The “for money” aggravator is
present in 44.8% of the cases. See Table 5.3. However, there is not a perfect overlap between the two
aggravators. There are a total of 89 cases in which both factors are present. Additionally, there are 54
other cases in which one of the two factors is present. Thus, at least one of the two factors is present in
143/239 cases, or about 59.8% of the M1-eligible cases.
183
The “killing witness” aggravator is present in 49.8% of the cases. The avoiding arrest aggravator
is present in 48.5% of the cases. See Table 5.3.
184
V.A.M.S. § 565.032.2(12).
185
V.A.M.S. § 565.032.2(10).
186
The “avoiding arrest” aggravator is present in 115 out of 119 cases where the “killing witness”
aggravator is present. Similarly, the “killing witness” aggravator is present in 115 out of 116 cases where
the “avoiding arrest” aggravator is present.
187
See e.g., State v. Simmons, 955 S.W.2d 752 (Mo. 1997) (upholding application of “killing
witness” aggravator in a robbery/murder case); State v. Brown, 902 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. 1995) (upholding
application of both “killing witness” and “avoiding arrest” aggravators in kidnapping/murder case); State v.
Kilgore, 771 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. 1989) (upholding application of “avoiding arrest” aggravator in a
robbery/murder case).
188
See, e.g., State v. Basile, 942 S.W.2d 342 (Mo. 1997).
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cases where the defendant killed the victim in response to the verbal encouragement of a
co-defendant. 189 Prosecutors have charged this aggravator in cases where there is a
conspiracy to commit murder, including cases that do not involve a typical agency or
employment relationship between co-defendants. 190

Prosecutors also charged this

aggravator in a case where two co-defendants jointly committed a non-homicide offense,
and one of the co-defendants subsequently killed the victim, contrary to the express
wishes of the other co-defendant. 191 Thus, in practice, this aggravator applies to any case
where two co-defendants jointly commit a crime that results in death, even if they did not
conspire to commit murder.
Under the current statute, 100% of the capital charges in the large database are
death-eligible. In Part V.B above, we estimated that 88.4% of the M1-eligible, noncapital cases are death-eligible under the current statute.

Overall, about 76.2% of

intentional homicides are death eligible. If the legislature amended the statute by
eliminating the six broadest statutory aggravating factors, the percentage of death-eligible
cases would decline dramatically. Under the revised statute, we estimate that only 58%
of the capital charges in the large database would be death-eligible, and only 37% of the
M1-eligible, non-capital cases would be death-eligible. 192 Overall, we estimate that only
40% of the M1-eligible cases in the large database would be death-eligible under the
revised statute.

189

See, e.g., State v. Ringo, 30 S.W.3d 811 (Mo. 2000) (after two co-defendants robbed a restaurant
and forced victim to hand over money from a safe, one co-defendant shot victim in response to verbal
encouragement from the other co-defendant).
190
For example, in small sample case numbers 5002 and 5003 the two co-defendants conspired to kill
and rob the victim. They lured the victim to defendant’s place and beat the victim to death with a bat. The
prosecutor sought death and charged the “agent/employee” aggravator against both defendants.
191
In small sample case numbers 1702 and 1705, two co-defendants conspired to assault a victim.
After beating the victim until he was probably unconscious, defendant 1702 set the victim’s house on fire,
contrary to the express wishes of defendant 1705. The victim was alive when the fire started but died from
carbon monoxide poisoning caused by the fire. The prosecutor brought capital charges and charged the
“agent/employee” aggravator against both defendants.
192
These figures are derived from aggravator data coded into our small sample. See supra notes __
and accompanying text (explaining the aggravator form). For each case in the small sample, the file
records one of three possible entries for each of the seventeen statutory aggravators: the prosecutor actually
charged that aggravator (PAC), the prosecutor could have charged that aggravator, but did not (CHC), or
there is no evidence to support that aggravator (NE). We determine whether a case is death-eligible under
this alternative scenario by deleting the six aggravators and then determining whether a prosecutor did or
could have charged at least one of the remaining aggravators.
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In sum, under the current statute, statutory aggravating factors eliminate only
about 8-10 percent of the cases from the class of death-eligible offenses.193
Consequently, approximately 88.4% percent of the M1-eligible, non-capital cases are
death-eligible under the statute, and about 76.2 percent of the total cases are deatheligible under the statute. 194 Under this statutory scheme, the Missouri legislature has
arguably abdicated its responsibility to “make the law” governing capital punishment and
delegated that responsibility to individual prosecutors. A revised statute, with a smaller
number of narrowly drawn aggravating factors, would shift the locus of decision-making
from prosecutors to legislators and would help satisfy the constitutional requirement that
aggravating circumstances “must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty.” 195
VI
Disparate Impact in Homicide Cases
As noted above, the Missouri homicide statute gives prosecutors extremely broad
discretion to choose which defendants should be convicted of M1, and which defendants
should be convicted of lesser included offenses. At the same time, there are substantial
differences in sentencing outcomes between defendants convicted of M1 and defendants
convicted of lesser included offenses. 196 This combination of factors – broad discretion
and substantial differences in sentencing outcomes – raises questions about whether the
exercise of discretion by different prosecutors affects different groups of people in
significantly different ways.

193
194
195
196

See supra Table 5.2.
See supra Part V.B.
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
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FIGURE 6.1

Figure 6.1 depicts the process that produces decisions about which defendants are
convicted of M1 and which defendants are convicted of lesser included offenses. Part VI
examines racial and geographic disparities at different points in that decision-making
process, focusing on the four decision points identified in Figure 6.1, as well as the M1
outcomes at the bottom of the picture. The first section examines geographic disparities
and the second section analyzes racial disparities. The final section presents the results of
a regression analysis that examines the interactions among these two sets of variables.
Throughout Part VI, the data tables have column headings identical to the
headings in Table 6.1 below. The headings of columns 1-4 correspond to the points
labeled 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Figure 6.1. The percentages in the top row are unweighted. The
percentages in the bottom row are based on weighted averages, as explained in Part IV.D
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above. The number in parentheses in each cell is the number of cases upon which the
percentage in that cell is based.
The percentages in columns 1-4 are calculated on the basis of the previous node in
the decision tree. Thus, the percentage in the top row of column 1 means that prosecutors
filed an M1 charge in 59 percent of all intentional homicide cases. The percentage in the
top row of column 2 means that prosecutors withdrew the M1 charge in 47.8 percent of
the cases that were charged as M1. Because column 3 corresponds to the number 3 in
Figure 6.1, the denominator of the fraction in column 3 is the number of cases charged as
M1. Similarly, the denominator of the fraction in column 4 is the number of cases in
which prosecutors pursued an M1 charge at trial.
TABLE 6.1
Prosecutor
Charged
M1
(1)

Prosecutor
Withdrew
M1 Charge
(2)

Pros. Took
M1 Charge
to Trial
(3)

Jury/Judge
Convicted of
Lesser
Charge
(4)

M1
Convictions
after M1
Charge
(5)

Total M1
Convictions

(6)

Large Dbase

59.0%

47.8%

44.1%

29.8%

39.1%

23.0%

(1046

(1046)

(617)

(617)

(272)

(617)

(1046)

55.8%
(247)

43.6%
(186)

46.8%
(186)

33.3%
(91)

40.8%
(186)

22.8%
(247)

Cases)
Small
Sample
(247
Cases)

Columns 5 and 6 display two different percentages. For both percentages, the
numerator is the sum of all M1 convictions, including M1 guilty pleas and M1 jury
verdicts, which is the shaded area in Figure 6.1. The denominator for the percentage in
column 5 is the number of cases in which the prosecutor filed an M1 charge. The
denominator for the percentage in column 6 is the universe of all intentional homicide
cases.

We utilize the same format for all the remaining tables in Part VI to analyze

geographic, racial and socioeconomic disparities. Table 6.1 also demonstrates that our
small sample reasonably represents the large sample, as one would expect from our
sampling methodology.
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A.

Geographic Disparity

Tables 6.2(A) to 6.2(C) present data on geographic disparity in the process for
deciding which defendants are convicted of first-degree murder. In all three tables, St.
Louis City and Jackson County (Kansas City) 197 are treated as separate geographic units.
Table 6.2(A) divides the other Missouri counties into two groups: MSA and rural. 198
Table 6.2(B) divides the other Missouri counties into three groups according to the
percentage of the non-white people included in the jury pool. 199 Table 6.2(C) combines
these measures by dividing the other Missouri counties in both ways: rural vs. MSA and
high vs. low percentage of non-whites in the jury pool, thus presenting the results from
the interaction of jury pool demographics and rural vs. MSA. In each column, we also
note the statistical significance of the pattern of percentages across that column. 200
Several features of the data presented in Table 6.2 are noteworthy.

First,

prosecutors in Jackson County charged M1 at a much lower rate than prosecutors in the
rest of the state.

Jackson County prosecutors charged M1 in only 28.9% of the

intentional homicide cases they prosecuted. The difference across statistical regions is
highly statistically significant. In contrast, prosecutors in St. Louis City charged M1 in
85.5% of their intentional homicide cases. Apart from Jackson County, prosecutors in
every other geographic category had an M1 charging rate above 50 percent, with a
statewide average of 59.0%. Given the low M1 charging rate in Jackson County, it is not
surprising that prosecutors in that county secured M1 convictions at a much lower rate
than the rest of the state.

Only 10.5% of the Jackson County cases yielded M1

convictions, compared to a statewide average of 23.0%.
197

Jackson County includes some areas that are outside the geographic limits of Kansas City, but
Kansas City accounts for the bulk of the population and land area of Jackson County.
198
MSA stands for “metropolitan statistical area.” As defined by the U.S. census bureau, any county
with a population density of at least 1000 people per square mile is part of an MSA. Aside from St. Louis
City and Jackson County, there are twenty counties in Missouri that are within an MSA.
199
We use census 2000 data to determine the percentage of nonwhite adults in each county.
Unfortunately, we cannot limit the sample to citizens, as these data are not available, and so our estimate of
the percentage of nonwhite jurors may be biased if immigrants are more likely to be nonwhite than the
general public. Missouri does not have a large immigrant population, so this bias is likely to be small.
200
Consistent with standard statistical practice, “NS” signifies “Not Significant”; “+” signifies a pvalue of 0.10 or less; “*” indicates a p-value of 0.05 or less; “**” indicates a p-value of 0.01 or less; and
“***” indicates a p-value of 0.001 or less. A p-value is a measure of how likely it is that one would obtain
results at least as skewed as those shown even if the differences were, in fact, simply random variation. A
p-value of 0.05 or less is generally considered to be statistically significant, and evidence of a relationship
between the two variables at issue (for example, the relationship between geographic region and M1
charging decisions found in Table 6.3(A), column 1).
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Table 6.2(A) shows that, after separating St. Louis City and Jackson County from
other urban counties, there are no significant differences between rural and
urban/suburban (MSA) counties. Prosecutors in rural and MSA counties charged M1 at
approximately the same rate (58.5% and 59.1%, respectively), and secured M1
convictions at approximately the same rate (25.9% and 27.4%, respectively). While it
appears that prosecutors in MSA counties were more likely than their rural counterparts
to withdraw an M1 charge, this result was not statistically significant. In contrast, jurors
in rural counties were more likely than their MSA counterparts to reject an M1 charge
proferred by a prosecutor, and this difference is statistically significant.
Table 6.2(A)
M1 Charging and Sentencing, Rural vs. Urban

SL City
(262 Cases)
Jackson
(228 Cases)
MSA
Counties
(274 Cases)
Rural
Counties
(282 Cases)
Total
(1046
Cases)

Prosecutor
Charged
M1
(1)
***

Prosecutor
Withdrew
M1 Charge
(2)
(NS)

Pros. Took
M1 Charge
to Trial
(3)
(NS)

M1
Convictions
After M1
Charge
(5)
***
30.8%
(224)
36.4%
(66)
46.3%
(162)

Total M1
Convictions
***(5)

46.4%
(224)
45.5%
(66)
40.7%
(162)

Jury/Judge
Convicted of
Lesser
Charge
(4)
***
39.4%
(104)
23.3%
(30)
15.2%
(66)

85.5%
(262)
28.9%
(228)
59.1%
(274)

50.9%
(224)
53.0%
(66)
47.5%
(162)

58.5%
(282)

41.8%
(165)

43.6%
(165)

31.9%
(72)

44.2%
(165)

25.9%
(282)

59.0%
(1046)

47.8%
(617)

44.1%
(617)

29.8%
(272)

39.1%
(617)

23.0%
(1046)
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26.3%
(262)
10.5%
(228)
27.4%
(274)

Table 6.2(B)
M1 Charging and Sentencing, Demographics of Jury Pool

SL City
(57% nonwhite)
(262 Cases)
Jackson
(32% nonwhite)
(228 Cases)
J Pool 1030% Nonwhite
(204 Cases)
J Pool 510% Nonwhite
(169 Cases)
J Pool 0-5%
Non-white
(183 Cases)
Total
(1046 Cases)

Prosecutor
Charged
M1
(1)
***

Prosecutor
Withdrew
M1 Charge
(2)
(NS)

Pros. Took
M1 Charge
to Trial
(3)
(NS)

M1
Convictions
After M1
Charge
(5)
**
30.8%
(224)

Total M1
Convictions
***

46.4%
(224)

Jury/Judge
Convicted
of Lesser
Charge
(4)
**
39.4%
(104)

85.5%
(262)

50.9%
(224)

28.9%
(228)

53.0%
(66)

45.5%
(66)

23.3%
(30)

36.4%
(66)

10.5%
(228)

59.3%
(204)

44.6%
(121)

43.8%
(121)

17.0%
(53)

47.9%
(121)

28.4%
(204)

55.0%
(169)

40.9%
(93)

44.1%
(93)

17.1%
(41)

51.6%
(93)

28.4%
(169)

61.7%
(183)

47.8%
(113)

38.9%
(113)

38.6%
(44)

37.2%
(113)

23.0%
(183)

59.0%
(1046)

47.8%
(617)

44.1%
(617)

29.8%
(272)

39.1%
(617)

23.0%
(1046)

26.3%
(262)

Table 6.2(B) presents results based upon jury pool demographics. As noted in the
Table, the jury pool in St. Louis City is 57.0% non-white, and the jury pool in Jackson
County is 32.3% non-white. Thus, one could divide the five geographic categories in
Table 6.2(B) into three groups: those with a high percentage of non-whites in the jury
pool (St. Louis City and Jackson County), those with a medium percentage (5-30%), and
those with a low percentage (0-5%). 201 Viewed in this way, it is evident that counties
with a medium percentage of non-whites in the jury pool have the highest M1 conviction
rate, measured as a percentage of the M1 charges. 202 Counties in the 5-10% range have
201

Aside from St. Louis City and Jackson County, there are only four counties in the state with jury
pools that are more than twenty percent non-white. They are: Pemiscot County (29.4%), Pulaski County
(24.3 %), Saint Louis County (24.0%), and Mississippi County (22.7%). Of these four, Saint Louis County
is an MSA county and the others are rural counties.
202
If one measures the M1 conviction rate as a percentage of the total cases, Jackson is an outlier, as
noted above. Here, though, we focus on the M1 conviction rate as a percentage of the M1 charges, which
is the percentage in column 5.
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an M1 conviction rate of 51.6%, and those in the 10-30% range have an M1 conviction
rate of 47.9%. In contrast, counties with a low percentage of non-whites in the jury pool
(0-5%), and those with a high percentage of non-whites (St. Louis and Jackson), all have
M1 conviction rates between 30 and 38 percent. Interestingly, the high M1 conviction
rate for counties with a medium non-white population appears to be largely a function of
jury decision-making, rather than aggressive charging by prosecutors. The jurors in these
counties were much more likely than their counterparts in other counties to return an M1
conviction instead of convicting the defendant of a lesser included offense. This is further
bolstered by the result that there are no statistically significant differences across
geographics regions in the prosecutor’s decision to withdraw M1 charges or in the rate at
which prosecutors took M1 charges to trial. The two primary decision points that
demonstrate geographic disparities are the initial M1 charging decision and the jury’s
decision to reject the M1 charge at trial.
Table 6.2(C) shows that the higher M1 conviction rate for counties with a
moderate percentage of non-whites in the jury pool applies to both rural and MSA
counties. Using a 5% cut-off to divide the rural counties into two groups, 203 Table 6.2(C)
shows that rural counties with a non-white population in the 5-30% range have an M1
conviction rate of 51.9%. In contrast, rural counties with a non-white population below
five percent have an M1 conviction rate of only 37.2%. For MSA counties (other than St.
Louis and Jackson), the difference is less pronounced, but not unimportant.

MSA

counties with a non-white population in the 10-30% range have an M1 conviction rate of
50.0%, compared to a 42.5% rate for MSA counties with a non-white population below
ten percent. 204

203

We use a 5% cut-off to divide rural counties, and a 10% cut-off to divide MSA counties, primarily
to ensure an adequate number of cases in each group. If we used a 5% cut-off for MSA counties, the total
number of cases in the 0-5 category would be very small. Similarly, if we used a 10% cut-off to divide
rural counties, the total number of cases in the 10-30 category would be quite small.
204
This pattern of differences is highly statistically significant.
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Table 6.2(C)
M1 vs. M2, Combine Rural/Urban and Jury Pool Demographics

SL City
(57% nonwhite)
(262 Cases)
Jackson
(32% nonwhite)
(228 Cases)
MSA, 10-30%
Non-white
(128 Cases)
MSA, 0-10%
Non-white
(146 Cases)
Rural, 5-30%
Non-white
(146 Cases)
Rural, 0-5%
Non-white
(136 Cases)
Total
(1046 Cases)

Prosecutor
Charged
M1
(1)
***

Prosecutor
Withdrew
M1 Charge
(2)
(NS)

Pros. Took
M1 Charge
to Trial
(3)
(NS)

M1
Convictions
After M1
Charge
(5)
***
30.8%
(224)

Total M1
Convictions
***

46.4%
(224)

Jury/Judge
Convicted
of Lesser
Charge
(4)
***
39.4%
(104)

85.5%
(262)

50.9%
(224)

28.9%
(228)

53.0%
(66)

45.5%
(66)

23.3%
(30)

36.4%
(66)

10.5%
(228)

64.1%
(128)

43.9%
(82)

43.9%
(82)

13.9%
(36)

50.0%
(82)

32.0%
(128)

54.8%
(146)

51.2%
(80)

37.5%
(80)

16.7%
(30)

42.5%
(80)

23.3%
(146)

54.1%
(146)

38.0%
(79)

46.8%
(79)

21.6%
(37)

51.9%
(79)

28.1%
(146)

63.2%
(136)

45.3%
(86)

40.7%
(86)

42.9%
(35)

37.2%
(86)

23.5%
(136)

59.0%
(1046)

47.8%
(617)

44.1%
(617)

29.8%
(272)

39.1%
(617)

23.0%
(1046)

26.3%
(262)

One possible explanation for the data is that M1 conviction rates are highest in
areas that have the greatest racial tension. It is plausible to suggest that racial tension is
low in counties where the population is virtually all white (0-5%), and in counties where
non-whites constitute a majority, or a substantial minority, of the population (St. Louis
and Jackson). In contrast, racial tension may be greatest in counties with an intermediate
level of non-white population. 205 While this Article cannot answer this question directly,
Section C investigates the interaction of geography with race-of-defendant and race-ofvictim. First, however, Section B describes the results of the analysis of race-of-victim
and race-of-defendant effects.

205

The combined lack of interracial homicides and the small number of venue changes (both of
which are ways to try to answer this question) make testing this hypothesis directly quite difficult.
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B.

Racial Disparities
Traditionally, empirical investigations of racial disparities in murder convictions

have broken down disparities by both race of the defendant, race of the victim, and their
interaction. This Section follows this framework; Tables 6.3(A) through 6.3(C) detail the
results. Because the racial identities of defendants and victims are only known in our
small sample, we use this smaller dataset to explore the potential racial disparities in M1
outcomes. Relying on the smaller sample implies that some large absolute differences in
outcomes will not be statistically significant; that is, they may have resulted from our
random sampling rather than from the decisions made in individual cases. Thus, these
tables also indicate the statistical significance of the differences: the top row of each
table notes whether the disparities in outcomes are statistically significant across races.206
In addition, because of our sampling plan, where we oversampled death-noticed cases
relative to other homicide cases, each cell contains the weighted average of the
appropriate case outcome. This is an unbiased estimate of the true percentage in the
larger database.
The disparities in processing M1 charges based upon race of the defendant are
not generally statistically significant. Table 6.3(A) provides the details. Focusing first on
the initial decision to charge M1, Table 6.3(A) demonstrates that there is no evidence of a
racial disparity based upon the race of the defendant. Prosecutors charge M1 about 55%
to 60% of the time. Prosecutors charging other-race defendants charge M1 less often
(28.1% of the time), but with a small number of other-race defendants, overall, this could
be due to chance variation in our small sample; there is no evidence of a statistically
significant difference between the charging rates. There is also no evidence of a race-ofdefendant disparity in the percentage of cases in which the prosecutor withdraws an M1
charge; for white and black defendants, this happens about 40.4% and 46.5% of the time,
206

The significance level is, in some sense, a measure of the likelihood that the observed difference in
percentages was too extreme to be caused by chance. More exactly, it is the probability that a deviation
from the null hypothesis as at least large as the observed deviation would be observed. In this case, the null
hypothesis is that race is independent from charging practices. The significance level is calculated based on
a Pearson Chi-squared test of independence. See Alan Agresti, Categorical Data Analysis (2002) for details.
Pearson Chi-Squared tests are a good approximation of an exact test when the expected number of cases
within each cell is greater than 5; there are some cases where the expected number of cases is less than 5.
We mention this in the text when relevant, and perform exact tests, which do not suffer from this problem,
whenever possible.

55

respectively. Prosecutors withdrew M1 charges against other-race defendants less often
(18%), but, again, with only 5 other-race defendants charged with M1, this difference is
not statistically significant. And, despite differences in the percentage of other-race
defendants who go to trial facing M1 charges, these differences are also statistically
insignificant.
Table 6.3(A): M1 vs. M2, Race of Defendant
Prosecutor
Charged
M1
(1)

Prosecutor
Withdrew
M1 Charge
(2)
NS

Pros. Took
M1 Charge
to Trial
(3)
NS

Jury/Judge
Convicted
of Lesser
Charge
(4)
+

M1
Convictions
After M1
Charge
(5)
NS

Total M1
Convictions
NS

55.0%
(122)

40.4%
(98)

44.2%
(98)

43.0%
(43)

40.7%
(98)

22.3%
(122)

58.3%
(116)

46.5%
(83)

47.3%
(83)

24.9%
(45)

41.7%
(83)

24.3%
(116)

28.1%
(9)

18.0%
(5)

82.0%
(5)

78.0%
(3)

18.0%
(5)

5.1%
(9)

55.8%
(247)

43.6%
(186)

46.8%
(186)

33.3%
(91)

40.8%
(186)

22.8%
(247)

NS
White
Defendant
(122 Cases)
Black
Defendant
(116 Cases)
Other-race
Defendant 207
(9 Cases)
Total
(247 Cases)

There is some evidence of racial differences in the rate at which the factfinder
convicts a defendant of a lesser charge in an M1 trial. White defendants are almost twice
as likely to be convicted of a lesser charge than black defendants (43.0% versus 24.9%
lesser charge conviction rates). In the final analysis, however, there is no statistically
significant race-of-defendant disparity in the proportion of M1 convictions. Thus,
throughout the homicide case decision tree, there is little evidence that the decisions of
the prosecutor or the judge/jury create disparities between defendants based on their race.
Table 6.3(B) provides estimates of outcome probabilities by race-of-victim.
Here, there are no statistically significant disparities based upon race-of-victim.
Prosecutors initially charged M1 about 55% of the time and withdrew those charges
about 40-50% of the time. While there is slight variation across race-of-victim in these

207

“Other-race” defendants are Hispanic or Asian. There were no individuals in the small sample
identified as Native American either as defendants or as victims.
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percentages, the differences are not statistically significant.208 Finally, there is no
evidence of a disparity in the rate at which cases yielded M1 convictions, either in the
subset of cases that went to trial or in all homicide cases. Overall, there is no evidence of
race-of-victim disparities in homicide decisions regarding M1 charging.
Table 6.3(B): M1 vs. M2, Race of Victim
Prosecutor
Charged
M1
(1)
White
Victim(s)
(149 Cases)
Black
Victim(s)
(87 Cases)
Other-race
Victim(s)
(9 Cases)
Total
(247 Cases)

Prosecutor
Withdrew
M1 Charge
(2)
NS

Pros. Took
M1 Charge
to Trial
(3)
NS

M1
Convictions
After M1
Charge
(5)
NS
46.8%
(116)

Total M1
Convictions
NS

45.8%
(116)

Jury/Judge
Convicted of
Lesser
Charge
(4)
NS
27.8%
(53)

NS
52.3%
(141)

40.5%
(116)

59.9%
(82)

49.1%
(64)

45.0%
(64)

31.4%
(34)

36.6%
(64)

21.9%
(82)

46.1%
(9)

5.5%
(6)

89.0%
(6)

87.6%
(4)

16.5%
(6)

7.6%
(9)

55.8%
(247)

43.6%
(186)

46.8%
(186)

33.3%
(91)

40.8%
(186)

22.8%
(247)

24.7%
(141)

To investigate potential racial disparities further, Table 6.3(C) presents the data
broken out by both race-of-defendant and race-of-victim. Because most homicides in
Missouri involve defendants and victims of the same race, investigating the disparities
based on these two variables separately sometimes masks which variable is more
important. Put another way, because of the strong correlation between defendant’s race
and victim’s race, a disparity across race-of-defendant may secondarily cause a disparity
across race-of-victim, and vice versa. Investigating the interaction between defendant
race and victim race can parse which of these two variables is more important. In
addition, studies of death penalty disparities have often found that the interaction of raceof-defendant and race-of-victim is more than the sum of its parts; that is, that the
disparities seen in one variable (race-of-defendant) depend on the other (race-of-victim).
Table 6.3(C) demonstrates that this is true to some extent in M1 prosecution as well.

208

Cases involving other-race victims have lower rates of M1 charges and the withdrawal of M1
charges, but with only 8 such cases, the differences are not statistically significant.
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Table 6.3(C): M1 vs. M2, Combined Race of Defendant / Race of Victim

White
Defendant
White Victim
(115 Cases)
White
Defendant
Black Victim
(4 Cases)
Black
Defendant
White Victim
(31 Cases)
Black
Defendant
Black Victim
(84 Cases)
Other
Combinations
(13 Cases)
Total
(247 Cases)

Prosecutor
Charged
M1
(1)

Prosecutor
Withdrew
M1 Charge
(2)

Pros. Took
M1 Charge
to Trial
(3)

M1
Convictions
After Charge
(5)

Total M1
Convictions

NS

Jury/Judge
Convicted
of Lesser
Charge
(4)
+

NS

NS

NS

NS

53.7%
(115)

40.0%
(92)

43.6%
(92)

39.2%
(40)

42.9%
(92)

23.1%
(115)

100%
(4)

50.0%
(4)

50%
(4)

87.6%
(2)

6.2%
(4)

6.2%
(4)

52.7%
(31)

41.5%
(22)

51.4%
(22)

2.7%
(12)

57.1%
(22)

30.0%
(31)

59.4%
(84)

49.3%
(60)

44.7%
(60)

27.3%
(32)

38.5%
(60)

22.9%
(84)

36.3%
(13)

9.9%
(8)

85.1%
(8)

85.5%
(5)

19.8%
(8)

7.2%
(13)

55.8%
(247)

43.6%
(186)

46.8%
(186)

33.3%
(91)

40.8%
(186)

22.8%
(247)

(6)

Consistent with Tables 6.3(A) and (B), there is no statistically significant
disparity based on the combination of race-of-defendant and race-of-victim in the initial
charging decision, the decision to withdraw an M1 charge, or the decision to pursue a
trial on M1 charges. Focusing on the next decision point, however, demonstrates a
marginally statistically significant racial disparity in the percentage of cases in which the
factfinder convicts the defendant of a lesser homicide charge. Factfinders convicted white
defendants who killed white victims of a lesser charge 39.2% of the time, compared to
27.3% of the time for black defendants who killed black victims. While the number of
cases for interracial homicides taken to M1 trial was quite small, they also tell an
interesting story. White defendants who killed black victims had only a 12.4% chance of
being convicted of M1 at trial, whereas black defendants who killed white victims had a
97.3% chance of being convicted of M1 at trial.
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Overall, the primary racial disparity in the homicide prosecution decision tree
appears during the trial, in the factfinder’s decision to convict on M1 or on a lesser
homicide charge. This disparity does not remain when looking at the entire process as a
whole; there is no statistically significant disparity in M1 convictions by race. While this
disparity is only marginally statistically significant, the clear trend in the data, which
demonstrates more leniency toward white defendants and those who kill black victims, is
worrisome overall.

C.

Interaction Effects
To conclude this analysis of M1 charging and conviction patterns in Missouri,

Table 6.4 presents logistic regressions of each decision on multiple variables at once,
rather than separating the variables to investigate individual disparities. As a descriptive
matter, a logistic regression of several variables at once demonstrates which variables
have larger disparities, and which disparities are more likely to be a by-product of
another disparity (for example, the disparity in race-of-victim as a by-product of a
disparity in race-of-defendant). For these reasons, it is important to investigate the
interaction among variables. Documenting disparities based upon individual variables, as
the earlier tables do, is also important because it demonstrates what disparities the system
creates across these critical fault lines in our society. For example, geographic disparities
in charging and sentencing practices are troublesome in general, and should therefore be
investigated. However, geographic disparities that lead to racial disparities are, perhaps,
even more worrisome, because of the historical legacy of discrimination in the criminal
justice system. The fact that one can control for racial disparities by including geography
as a variable does not negate the overall impact of racial differences; it simply suggests
that geographic differences may be causing racial disparities.
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Table 6.4: M1 vs. M2, Interaction of Racial and Geographic Differences
Prosecutor
Charged
M1
(1)
R2=0.09
Baseline:
MSA with 1030% nonwhite jury
pool; White
Defendant,
White Victim
White
Defendant
Black Victim
(4 Cases)
Black
Defendant
White Victim
(31 Cases)
Black
Defendant
Black Victim
(84 Cases)
Other Racial
Combinations
(13 cases)
SL City
(46 Cases)
Jackson
(39 Cases)
MSA, 0-10%
Non-white
(45 Cases)
Rural, 5-30%
Non-white
(45 Cases)
Rural, 0-5%
Non-white
(35 Cases)

Prosecutor
Withdrew
M1 Charge
(2)
R2=0.10

1

1

Pros.
Took M1
Charge to
Trial
(3)
R2=0.09
1

∞
(4)

1.7
(4)

1.1
(4)

∞ 209
(2)

0.3*
(4)

0.4
(4)

1.1
(31)

1.2
(22)

1.1
(22)

0.01**
(12)

2.8
(22)

2.0
(31)

1.0
(84)

2.2+
(60)

0.6
(60)

0.08**
(32)

1.5
(60)

1.2
(84)

0.5
(13)

0.2+
(8)

8.0+
(8)

2.7
(5)

0.5
(8)

0.3
(13)

2.0
(46)
0.3*
(39)
0.6
(45)

7.1*
(39)
3.5
(15)
14.6*
(34)

0.2*
(39)
0.4
(15)
0.1*
(34)

1.9
(18)
0.3
(8)
0
(12)

0.2*
(39)
0.5
(15)
0.6
(34)

0.4+
(46)
0.3*
(39)
0.4
(45)

0.9
(45)

4.4
(38)

0.2
(38)

0.3
(20)

0.7
(38)

0.7
(45)

1
(35)

5.1
(30)

0.2
(30)

0.02**
(13)

1.2
(30)

1.1
(35)

Jury/Judge
Convicted of
Lesser
Charge
(4)
R2=0.31
1

M1
Convictions
After M1
Charge
(5)
R2=0.09
1

Total M1
Convictions
(6)
R2=0.06
1

Table 6.4 presents logistic regressions of critical decision points. Logistic
regressions estimate the “odds ratio” of a case with the given attributes (for example, a
case from Saint Louis City) compared with a baseline case. The odds ratio is defined as
209

Because all cases in this category were treated the same way, the model cannot estimate an odds
ratio. As the odds are 100% to 0%, they are infinite. Similarly, for cases in which the odds are 0% to 100%,
the odds ratio is 0, which is also indeterminate (because logistic regressions actually estimate natural
logartihm of odds ratios, and the logarithm of zero is indeterminate).
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the odds of an outcome for a case with given attributes divided by the odds of an outcome
for the baseline cases. For Table 6.4, the baseline case is a case from a county in an MSA
with 10-30% non-white jury pool, with a white defendant and a white victim. Thus, the
odds ratio of 2.0 for Saint Louis City in M1 charging means that the odds were 2.0 times
higher that a white defendant with a white victim from Saint Louis City was charged with
M1 as compared to the odds that a white defendant with a white victim from a county in
an MSA with 10-30% minority jury pool was charged with M1. Similarly, with an odds
ratio of 1, the odds that a black defendant who killed a black victim was charged with M1
are the same as the odds that a white defendant who killed a white victim was charged
with M1. In general, the closer the odds ratio is to one, the smaller the disparity in
outcomes between the baseline and the variable at issue. One final note: in order to
estimate accurately, logistic regression must have some variation in outcomes. If all cases
of one type have the same outcome, logistic regression estimates that all potential cases
of the same type would have that outcome – i.e., that one could predict perfectly what
would happen in these cases. Thus, the logistic regression for the M1 charging decision
cannot estimate the odds ratio of white defendants with black victims, because that value
is infinite. In situations with a small number of cases (such as here, with only four such
cases), one cannot rely on this estimate; it simply means that out of the four cases which
had white defendants with black victims, all four defendants were charged with M1. It
does not determine whether that fact is statistically significant. 210
The results presented in Table 6.4 demonstrate that geography is the strongest
predictor of M1 charging and conviction patterns; most of the statistically significant
variables are geographic. First, in the decision to charge M1, Jackson County has odds of
0.3 to 1 compared to the baseline. Thus, the Jackson County disparity in M1 charging
practice does not disappear when controlling for race; it is also of about the same
magnitude as Table 6.2(C) suggests. Jackson County is the only factor listed in Table 6.4
that presents a statistically significant disparity in M1 charging patterns. With respect to
the next decision point, whether the prosecutor withdrew the M1 charge, the primary
disparity is between MSA counties with small minority jury pools and the baseline (of

210

Operationally, these four cases are dropped from the analysis, because they provide no
information to help estimate other parameters, and because the model cannot estimate an infinite odds ratio.
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MSA counties with larger minority jury pools). Cases from MSA counties with 0-10%
non-white jury pools had odds 14.6 times greater that the prosecutor withdrew the M1
charge. In addition, cases from Saint Louis City and cases with black defendants and
black victims are more likely to be those in which the prosecutor withdrew the initial M1
charge. In Saint Louis City, the odds are 7 times greater than the baseline; for black
defendants who kill black victims, the odds are 2.2 times as large as the baseline.
The final two columns of Table 6.4 present the odds ratios for M1 convictions.
Geographic disparities, once again, are more significant than racial disparities. With
respect to the odds of an M1 conviction after an initial M1 charge, cases from Saint Louis
City had an odds ratio five times smaller than the baseline. This accentuates the disparity
between St Louis City and other counties that exists without controlling for race:
different distributions of racial groups hide a larger geographic disparity for Saint Louis
City. This contrasts with Jackson County, where controlling for race does not change the
geographic pattern much. While the odds ratio for cases with white defendants who kill
black victims is also statistically significant, with only four cases of this type, the result is
not terribly robust. The odds of an M1 conviction in Jackson County, based on the entire
universe of cases, are 3.3 times smaller than the odds for the baseline case. For Saint
Louis City, the odds of an M1 conviction, based on the universe of cases, are 2.5 times
smaller than the baseline odds, although this result is only marginally statistically
significant.
Overall, disparities across different counties are significant and enduring. Saint
Louis City and Jackson County have significantly different charging and conviction
patterns than other counties, even after controlling for race. With respect to racial
disparities, there are large disparities in the rate at which judges and juries convict
defendants of M1, rather than a lesser homicide charge. Focusing on race alone, white
defendants and those defendants who kill black victims are less likely to be convicted of
M1.
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VII.
Life Versus Death
As noted above, the Missouri homicide statute gives prosecutors extremely broad
discretion to make charging decisions that largely determine which defendants should be
sentenced to death, and which defendants should receive milder sentences. 211 This broad
discretion raises questions about whether the exercise of discretion by different
prosecutors affects different groups of people in significantly disparate ways. Figure 7.1
depicts the process that produces decisions about which defendants live and which ones
are sentenced to death. Part VII examines racial and geographic disparities at different
points in this decision-making process, focusing on the four decision points identified in
Figure 7.1. The first section examines geographic disparities and the second section
analyzes racial disparities. The final section presents the results of a regression analysis
that examines the interactions among these two sets of variables.

211

See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
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FIGURE 7.1

Following the convention in Part VI, the data tables throughout Part VII have
column headings identical to the headings in Table 7.1 below. The headings of columns
1-4 correspond to the points labeled 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Figure 7.1. The percentages for the
large database in the top row of table 7.1 are unweighted. The percentages for the small
sample in the bottom row are based on weighted averages. The number in parentheses in
each cell is the unweighted denominator; that is, the number of cases that the percentage
in that cell is based upon. The percentages in columns 1-3 are calculated on the basis of
the previous node in the decision tree. Thus, the percentage in the top row of column 1
means that prosecutors filed a capital charge in 12.7% of all intentional homicide cases.
Similarly, the percentage in the top row of column 2 means that prosecutors pursued a
capital trial in 39.8 percent of the cases that were charged as capital cases. Columns 4
and 5 display two different measurements for the frequency of death sentences. The
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denominator for the percentage in column 4 is the number of cases in which the
prosecutor took a capital charge to trial. The denominator for the percentage in column 5
is the universe of all intentional homicide cases. We utilize the same format for all the
remaining tables in Part VII to analyze geographic and racial disparities.

TABLE 7.1

Large
Database
(1046 Cases)
Small
Sample
(247 Cases)

A.

Prosecutor
Filed Capital
Charge
(1)

Prosecutor
Pursued
Capital Trial
(2)

Jury Rejected
Capital Charge
at Trial
(3)

Total Death
Sentences
(5)

50.9%
(53)

Death
Sentences
After Capital
Trial
(4)
49.1%
(53)

12.7%
(1046)

39.8%
(133)

13.0%
(247)

39.4%
(127)

48.0%
(50)

52.0%
(50)

2.7%
(247)

2.5%
(1046)

Geographic Disparity

Tables 7.2(A) to 7.2(C) present data on geographic disparity in the process for
deciding which defendants are convicted of first-degree murder. These tables follow the
same rubric as in Part VI.A above.
Several aspects of the data in Table 7.2 are noteworthy. First, prosecutors in St.
Louis City and Jackson County filed capital charges much less frequently than
prosecutors in the rest of the state. In St. Louis, prosecutors charged capital in 6.5% of
the intentional homicide cases; in Jackson, the comparable figure was 1.3%. But in the
rest of the state, prosecutors charged capital in roughly 20% of the intentional homicide
cases. This pattern of differences is highly statistically significant. Prosecutors in St.
Louis and Jackson also obtained capital convictions far less frequently than their
counterparts in the rest of the state. St. Louis prosecutors obtained capital convictions in
fewer than one-half of one percent of intentional homicide cases. Jackson prosecutors
produced no capital convictions in more than 200 cases. In contrast, prosecutors in the
rest of Missouri obtained capital convictions in about 4.5% of all intentional homicide
cases. This pattern is highly statistically significant.
If one sets aside St. Louis City and Jackson County, and focuses on the rest of the
state, other interesting points emerge. Table 7.2(A) shows that rural counties and MSA
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counties have fairly similar capital charging and sentencing rates. In contrast, Table
7.2(B) shows that there is greater variability across groups of counties if one utilizes the
racial composition of the jury pool to divide counties into groups. Defendants in counties
where the jury pool is 10-30% non-white were more than twice as likely to be sentenced
to death as defendants in counties where the jury pool is 5-10% non-white.

This

difference does not correlate to differences in capital charging rates between the two
groups: indeed, the charging rate in the 5-10% group was slightly higher. Rather, the
difference in sentencing outcomes is primarily attributable to the fact that juries in the 510% counties were twice as likely to reject capital charges at trial as juries in the 10-30%
counties.
Table 7.2(A)
Capital Charging and Death Sentences, Rural vs. Urban 212
Prosecutor
Filed Capital
Charge
(1)
***

Prosecutor
Pursued
Capital Trial
(2)
NS

Jury Rejected
Capital Charge
at Trial
(3)
*

Total Death
Sentences
(5)
***

87.5%
(8)
100.0%
(2)

Death
Sentences
After Capital
Trial
(4)
*
12.5%
(8)
0
(2)

SL City
(262 Cases)
Jackson
(228 Cases)

6.5%
(262)
1.3%
(228)

47.1%
(17)
66.7%
(3)

MSA
Counties
(274 Cases)
Rural
Counties
(282 Cases)
Total
(1046 Cases)

17.9%
(274)

36.7%
(49)

44.4%
(18)

55.6%
(18)

3.6%
(274)

22.7%
(282)

39.1%
(64)

40.0%
(25)

60.0%
(25)

5.3%
(282)

12.7%
(1046

39.8%
(133)

50.9%
(53)

49.1%
(53)

2.5%
(1046)

212

0.4%
(262)
0
(228)

The statistical test used in Tables 7.2(A)-7.2(C) was Fisher’s Exact test, which does not rely on
large samples, but instead proves an exact estimate of the p-value. Throughout this Article, Fisher’s Exact
test was used whenever possible (because of some small cell counts); although because of the sampling
scheme, the more general Pearson Chi-Squared Test was used for much of the small sample testing.
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Table 7.2(B)
Capital Charging and Death Sentences, Demographics of Jury Pool
Prosecutor
Filed Capital
Charge
(1)
***

Prosecutor
Pursued
Capital Trial
(2)
NS

Jury Rejected
Capital Charge
at Trial
(3)
*

Total Death
Sentences
(5)
***

87.5%
(8)
100.0%
(2)

Death
Sentences
After Capital
Trial
(4)
*
12.5%
(8)
0
(2)

SL City
(262 Cases)
Jackson
(228 Cases)

6.5%
(262)
1.3%
(228)

47.1%
(17)
66.7%
(3)

Pop 10-30%
Non-white
(204 Cases)
Pop 5-10%
Non-white
(169 Cases)
Pop 0-5%
Non-white
(183 Cases)
Total
(1046 Cases)

19.1%
(204)

48.7%
(39)

31.6%
(19)

68.4%
(19)

6.4%
(204)

21.3%
(169)

38.9%
(36)

64.3%
(14)

35.7%
(14)

3.0%
(169)

20.8%
(183)

26.3%
(38)

30%
(10)

70.0%
(10)

3.8%
(183)

12.7%
(1046)

39.8%
(133)

50.9%
(53)

49.1%
(53)

2.5%
(1046)
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0.4%
(262)
0
(228)

Table 7.2(C)
Capital Charging and Death Sentences
Combine Rural/Urban and Jury Pool Demographics
Prosecutor
Filed Capital
Charge
(1)
***

Prosecutor
Pursued
Capital Trial
(2)
NS

Jury Rejected
Capital Charge
at Trial
(3)
*

Death
Sentences
After Capital
Trial
(4)
*
(12.5%)
(8/262)
0
(2)

Total Death
Sentences
(5)
***

SL City
(262 Cases)
Jackson
(228 Cases)

6.5%
(262)
1.3%
(228)

47.1%
(17)
66.7%
(3)

87.5%
(8)
100.0%
(2)

MSA, Pop
10-30%
Non-white
(128 Cases)
MSA, Pop 010% Nonwhite
(146 Cases)
Rural, Pop 530% Nonwhite
(146 Cases)
Rural, Pop 05% Nonwhite
(136 Cases)
Total
(1046 Cases)

16.4%
(128)

52.4%
(21)

27.3%
(11)

72.7%
(11)

6.2%
(128)

19.2%
(146)

25.0%
(28)

71.4%
(7)

28.6%
(7)

1.4%
(146)

24.0%
(146)

45.7%
(35)

43.7%
(16)

56.2%
(16)

6.2%
(146)

21.3%
(136)

31.0%
(29)

33.3%
(9)

66.7%
(9)

4.4%
(136)

12.7%
(1046)

39.8%
(133)

50.9%
(53)

49.1%
(53)

2.5%
(1046)

0.4%
(262)
0
(228)

Table 7.2(C) displays significant variability across groups of counties other than
Jackson and St. Louis City. The initial capital charging rates, while ranging only from a
low of 16.4% (MSA, 10-30) to a high of 24.0% (rural, 5-30), demonstrate a statistically
significant relationship between geographic region and capital charging. In contrast,
while there is much more variability in the rate at which prosecutors took capital charges
to trial (column 2), this pattern is not statistically significant, and there is no evidence to
suggest that the variability across geographic regions is systematic. The differences in the
rates at which juries rejected capital charges at trial (column 3), however, are also
statistically significant. Excluding Jackson and SL City, these range from a high of 71.4%
(MSA 0-10) to just 27.3% (MSA 10-30). Overall, MSA counties with a jury pool that is
0-10% non-white had the lowest capital trial rate (25.0%) and the highest jury rejection
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rate (71.4%), which resulted in the lowest capital conviction rate (1.4%). In contrast,
MSA counties with a jury pool that is 10-30% non-white had the highest capital trial rate
(52.4%) and the lowest jury rejection rate (27.3%), resulting in a 6.2% capital conviction
rate. As the statistical significance demonstrates, this final pattern in death sentences is
not a product of random variation; these differences are due to geography.
In sum, if one compares St. Louis City and Jackson County to the rest of the state,
it appears that their very low capital conviction rates can be attributed to low initial
capital charging rates. In contrast, if one leaves aside St. Louis City and Jackson County
and compares the remaining groups of counties to each other, it appears that differences
in sentencing outcomes have more to do with jury behavior and downstream
prosecutorial decisions, rather than the initial decision to charge a case as capital or noncapital.
B.

Racial Disparity

Tables 7.3(A) through 7.3(C) present data on the racial disparities associated with
the process of deciding which defendants are sentenced to death. Table 7.3(A) focuses on
defendant’s race as a fault line for disparities. Several noteworthy facts emerge from the
results. First, all four decision points exhibit statistically significant disparities when
comparing black versus white defendants, although adding other-race defendants
decreases the power of the test sufficiently that overall, the differences across all races
are not necessarily statistically significant. With 7.7% of black defendants facing a capital
charge, they are about a third as likely to do so as white defendants, 21.2% of whom face
a capital charge at some point during the prosecution. The rates at which prosecutors took
capital charges to trial also vary significantly, in the opposite direction: white defendants
are two-thirds as likely to face a capital trial after capital charges are filed than black
defendants. Thus, many more white defendants face death penalty charges, but charges
for these white defendants are more likely to be dropped, resulting in a statistically
significant difference of 6.6% capital trial rate for white defendants versus 4.1% capital
trial rate for black defendants. Exacerbating the impact of this disparity on death
sentences is the fact that juries rejected capital charges more often for black defendants
(52.2% versus 40%). Overall, because of the higher original filing rate and the slightly
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higher jury sentencing rate, white defendants are twice as likely to be sentenced to death
as black defendants.
Table 7.3(A): Capital Charging and Death Sentences
Race of Defendant
Prosecutor
Filed Capital
Charge
(1)
***
21.2%
(122)

Prosecutor
Pursued
Capital Trial
(2)
*
31.2%
(80)

Jury Rejected
Capital Charge
at Trial
(3)
NS†
40.0%
(25)

Death
Sentences After
Capital Trial
(4)
NS†
60.0%
(25)

Total Death
Sentences
(5)

NS†
White
4.0%
(122)
Defendant
(122 Cases)
Black
7.7%
53.5%
52.2%
47.8%
2.0%
(116)
(43)
(23)
(23)
(116)
Defendant
(116 Cases)
Other-race
10.1%
50.0%
100%
0%
0
(9)
(4)
(2)
(2)
(9)
Defendant
(9 Cases)
Total
13.0%
39.4%
48%
52%
2.7%
(247 Cases)
(247)
(127)
(50)
(50)
(247)
† Note that while the overall racial pattern is not statistically significant the difference between white
victims and black victims is highly statistically significant (p-value < 0.001); the inclusion of other-race
defendants significantly lowers the power of the test.

Table 7.3(B) presents the data for the capital charging process broken out by race
of victim. Similar to the race-of-defendant results, differences between cases with white
victims and cases with black victims are statistically significant, even though overall,
race-of-victim is not a statistically significant predictor of capital trial rates or death
sentences after a capital trial. Starting with the initial decision to file a capital charge,
however, significant disparities emerge. Prosecutors are less than half as likely to file a
capital charge in cases that involve black victims (7.0% of the time) compared to cases
that involve white victims (18.5% of the time). Again, prosecutors are less likely to
pursue a capital trial initially in cases with white victims, but jurors are more likely to
sentence the defendant to death in these cases. These two effects counter-balance each
other, leaving the relative percentage of death sentences about the same as the relative
percentage of capital charges: just over two to one, with cases involving white victims
imposing a death sentence 4.0% of the time, while cases involving black victims have a
death sentence imposed 1.4% of the time.
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Table 7.3(B): Capital Charging and Death Sentences
Race of Victim(s)
Prosecutor
Filed Capital
Charge
(1)
***

Prosecutor
Pursued
Capital Trial
(2)
NS†

Jury Rejected
Capital Charge
at Trial
(3)
+†

Death
Sentences After
Capital Trial
(4)
+†

Total Death
Sentences
(5)

+†
White
18.5%
34.7%
37.5%
62.5%
4.0%
(149)
(92)
(32)
(32)
(149)
Victim(s)
(149 Cases)
Black
7.0%
51.6%
62.5%
37.5%
1.4%
(89)
(31)
(16)
(16)
(89)
Victim(s)
(89 Cases)
Other-race
10.1%
50.0%
100%
0%
0
(9)
(4)
(2)
(2)
(9)
Victim(s)
(9 Cases)
Total
13.0%
39.4%
48%
52%
2.7%
(247 Cases)
(247)
(127)
(50)
(50)
(247)
† Note that while the overall racial pattern is not statistically significant – or only marginally so – the
difference between white victims and black victims is highly statistically significant (p-value < 0.001); the
inclusion of other-race defendants significantly lowers the power of the test.

As with homicide prosecution in general, defendant race and victim race
disparities are strongly correlated because most homicides are intra-racial. Our study is
no exception, with at least 80.6% of homicides involving defendants and victims of the
same race. Table 7.3(C) presents the interaction of these two variables. Here, all of the
decision points except the decision to pursue a capital trial after filing a capital charge
demonstrate statistically significant racial disparities. First, with respect to the
prosecutor’s decision to file a capital charge, white defendants who kill white victims
have the highest chance of facing a capital charge (21.6%). The risk of facing a capital
charge is only about 60% as high if the victim of a white defendant is black. Black
defendants have an even lower risk. Following the pattern for white defendants, for cases
with black defendants, the risk of a capital charge is almost 50% higher for those
defendants who killed white victims.
Variations in the rates at which prosecutors decide to pursue a capital trial are not
statistically significant. The rate at which juries imposed death sentences at trial,
however, demonstrates significant racial disparities. If one disregards the one case where
a white defendant killed a black victim, it is clear that black defendants who kill white
victims are treated the most harshly, with a 75% chance of a death sentence after capital
trial. This is more than twice as large as the 33.3% chance of a death sentence for black
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defendants with black victims. White defendants face a 60.9% chance of a death sentence
after capital trial if their victim was white. Overall, the difference in death sentence rates
is more than four-fold from the lowest probability of receiving a death sentence (1.2% for
black defendants with black victims) to the highest probability (6.2%, for white
defendants with black victims). Interestingly, cross-race cases are treated more harshly
than intra-race cases; defendants in cross-race cases receive death sentences in 4.9% of
the cases, while defendants in intra-race cases receive a death sentence in only 2.8% of
the cases. This result is only marginally significant, perhaps because of the small number
of cross-race cases (31 total). Unfortunately, it is impossible to tell whether this finding
would persist with a larger number of cross-race cases.

Table 7.3(C): Capital Charging and Death Sentences
Race of Defendant and Race of Victim Combined

White
Defendant
White Victim
(115 Cases)
White
Defendant
Black Victim
(4 Cases)
Black
Defendant
White Victim
(31 Cases)
Black
Defendant
Black Victim
(84 Cases)
Other
Combinations
(13 Cases)
Total
(247 Cases)

Prosecutor
Filed Capital
Charge
(1)
***

Prosecutor
Pursued
Capital Trial
(2)
NS

Death
Sentences
After Capital
Trial
(4)
***
60.9%
(23)

Total Death
Sentences
(5)

30.3%
(76)

Jury Rejected
Capital
Charge at
Trial
(3)
***
39.1%
(23)

21.6%
(115)
12.4%
(4)

50%
(2)

0%
(1)

100%
(1)

6.2%
(4)

10.4%
(31)

57.1%
(14)

25.0%
(8)

75.0%
(8)

4.5%
(31)

6.9%
(84)

51.7%
(29)

66.7%
(15)

33.3%
(15)

1.2%
(84)

10.8%
(13)

50%
(6)

100%
(3)

0%
(3)

0%
(13)

13.0%
(247)

39.4%
(127)

48%
(50)

52%
(50)

2.7%
(247)

*
4.0%
(115)

Overall, the primary racial difference in capital charging is the difference across
racial lines in intra-race cases. Homicides with white defendants and white victims are
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treated significantly more harshly than homicides with black defendants and black
victims. This could be the product of geography –prosecutors in areas with large black
populations are less likely to seek the death penalty, and juries from these locations are
less likely to impose the death penalty. The next section turns to this question,
investigating the interplay between race and geography.
C.

Interactions Between Variables

As a final description of the disparities in treatment across cases, Table 7.4
presents the results of several logistic regressions, with the dependent variable of each
regression being a decision point in Figure 7.1, and the independent variables being
geography (as measured by both MSA and jury pool) and race (including both race-ofdefendant and race-of-victim). As with Table 6.4, the values presented in Table 7.4 are
the odds ratio of the variable listed, as compared with the baseline.
Once again, geography trumps race as a relative explanation for the disparities
seen; all of the racial disparities are statistically insignificant when controlling for
geography. There is an apparent disparity in cases involving white defendants with black
victims: all of the defendants who went to trial received a death sentence. However, with
only four such cases in the sample, and only one that went to trial, there is not statistically
significant evidence of a disparity between these cases and others; the same is true for the
result that no cases received a death sentence if either the defendant or the victim was
other-race.
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Table 7.4: Capital Charging and Death Sentences
Interaction between Geography and Race

Baseline:
MSA with
10-30% nonwhite jury
pool; White
Defendant;
White Victim
White
Defendant
Black Victim
(4 Cases)
Black
Defendant
White Victim
(27 Cases)
Black
Defendant
Black Victim
(76 Cases)
Other-race
victim or
defendant
(__ Cases)
SL City
(262 Cases)
Jackson
(228 Cases)
MSA, 0-10%
Non-white
(146 Cases)
Rural, 5-30%
Non-white
(146 Cases)
Rural, 0-5%
Non-white
(136 Cases)

Prosecutor
Filed Capital
Charge
(1)
R2=0.13
1

Prosecutor
Pursued
Capital Trial
(2)
R2=0.05
1

Jury Rejected
Capital Charge
at Trial
(3)
R2=0.28
1

Death
Sentences After
Capital Charge
(4)
R2=0.28
1

Total Death
Sentences

1.5

2.7

0

∞

17.4

0.9

2.7

0.8

1.2

3.7

0.6

2.2

4.6

0.2

0.6

0.5

2.6

∞

0

0

0.5

0.7

28.5*

0.04*

0.04*

0.06***

2.7

∞

0

0

0.9

0.4

28.4+

0.04+

0.1*

2.0

0.7

1.1

0.9

1.3

1.4

0.9

2.4

0.4

0.8

(5)
R2=0.14
1

Most of the disparities that are statistically significant are based upon
geography. The decision-making in Jackson County and Saint Louis City creates
disparities in outcomes and process. The odds that a defendant in Jackson County faces a
capital charge are sixteen times less (0.06 times more) than the odds for a baseline case.
No death sentences were imposed in Jackson County during the period of the study.
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Prosecutors in St. Louis City are slightly less likely to file capital charges and pursue
capital trials than prosecutors in the baseline case. However, juries reject capital charges
in St. Louis City at very high rates, after controlling for race. A defendant from St. Louis
City facing a capital trial has odds 28.5 times higher than the baseline of receiving a
sentence less than death at trial. Overall, this translates into a much smaller risk of a death
sentence in St Louis City – the odds of receiving a death sentence (out of all intentional
homicides) are 25 times smaller than the odds of receiving a death sentence in a baseline
county. Cases from MSA counties with small minority jury pools (0-10%) also have this
pattern: charging and trial practices are similar to other counties, but juries reject capital
charges at a rate 28.4 times greater than the baseline rate. This is consistent with the
findings in Table 7.2(C), which suggest that MSA counties with small minority jury
pools, or very large minority jury pools (Jackson and St. Louis City) impose death
sentences less frequently than other counties in Missouri.
In summary, geographic disparities endure after controlling for race-ofdefendant and race-of-victim, while race effects are no longer present, meaning that
geography is better at explaining the capital decision-making process than race. With the
important exception of Jackson County, the results suggest that differences in jury
decision-making explain a significant portion of the final geographic disparities in death
sentencing rates.
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VIII
Conclusions and Recommendations
Over the past few decades, numerous countries throughout the world have
abolished capital punishment. Despite this global trend, there is broad public support for
continued use of capital punishment in the United States. In light of that public support,
we assume that Missouri, like other states in the U.S., will retain the death penalty as the
ultimate criminal sanction for the foreseeable future. 213 However, as the U.S. Supreme
Court has stated, the Eighth Amendment requires that “capital punishment must be
limited to those offenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’
and whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’” 214 The
preceding analysis suggests that the defendants who are sentenced to death in Missouri
are not necessarily the most culpable, or those who commit the most serious crimes.
Instead, the defendants who are sentenced to death are disproportionately those who
commit their crimes in counties where prosecutors make aggressive use of capital
punishment.
The underlying problem is the breadth of prosecutorial discretion.

As the

preceding analysis demonstrates, prosecutors in Missouri prosecuted about 800 deatheligible homicides between January 1997 and December 2001. Only about 50 of those
cases led to capital trials. The current statute does not provide any criteria to guide
prosecutors in selecting the 50 capital trials from the 800 death-eligible cases. Without
clear statutory criteria to guide them, prosecutors in different counties exercise their
discretion in very different ways. In Jackson County, prosecutors held capital trials in
fewer than one-half of one percent of the intentional homicide cases they prosecuted. In
Boone, Jasper and Pemiscot counties, though, prosecutors took capital charges to trial in
more than fifteen percent of their cases.
The following recommendations are designed primarily to reduce disparities
across counties in the implementation of capital punishment by limiting the class of
death-eligible offenses. The recommendations are divided into two groups. The second

213
214

New Jersey recently became the first state to abolish the death penalty in over 50 years.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319

(2002)).
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group of recommendations focuses exclusively on the statutory aggravating factors. The
first group of recommendations addresses other issues.
A.

Recommendations That Do Not Relate to Statutory Aggravators

1.

Moratorium and Further Study: We assume that there is broad consensus

that the death penalty should be reserved for the most serious crimes and the most
culpable offenders.

This study raises doubts about whether, in practice, capital

punishment in Missouri actually conforms to that standard. Given the limitations we
faced in collecting data about the implementation of capital punishment in Missouri, 215
we recognize that the Missouri legislature may be hesitant to adopt statutory reforms
without first commissioning a state-sponsored study to obtain more comprehensive data.
We support the idea that there should be a state-sponsored study of capital punishment in
Missouri. However, the present study has exposed problems that are sufficiently serious
to warrant a legislatively imposed moratorium while a further study is being conducted.
2.

Introduce a district attorney system in Missouri:

For administrative

purposes, Missouri is divided into 115 counties, each with its own chief prosecutor. This
means that there are 115 independent decision-makers in Missouri, each of whom may
have somewhat different views about capital punishment. This is a relatively large
number compared to other important death penalty states. 216 Other things being equal, a
larger number of independent decision-makers increases the risk of geographic disparities
across prosecutorial districts. Although Missouri has 115 counties, Missouri’s judicial
system is divided into 45 judicial districts, most of which encompass two or more
counties. We recommend that the legislature consider adopting a district attorney system
wherein the state would be divided into 45 prosecutorial districts with the same
boundaries as the 45 judicial districts. By reducing the number of independent decisionmakers, this proposal would reduce the risk of geographic disparities across districts in
the implementation of capital punishment.

215

See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
Two of the other leading death penalty states have a larger number of independent decision
makers: Texas has 155 and Virginia has 120. However, most of the other leading death penalty states have
fewer independent prosecutors. There are 88 in Ohio, 67 in Pennsylvania, 58 in California (the most
populous state), 48 in Georgia, 41 in Alabama, 39 in North Carolina, 27 in Oklahoma and only 20 in
Florida (the 4th most populous state). Information from Steven M. Perry, Statistician, Bureau of Justice
Statistics. www.oip.usdoj.gov/bjs.
216
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3.

Amend the statutory definition of deliberation: Missouri defines the term

“deliberation” to mean “cool reflection for any length of time no matter how brief.” 217
Under this definition, there is no meaningful distinction between first degree murder,
which is death-eligible, and “knowing” second degree murder, which is not deatheligible. 218 We recommend that the Missouri legislature revise the statutory definition of
“deliberation” to require evidence of advance planning or a preconceived design before
the killing occurs. We estimate that at least 84 percent of all cases in the large database
are M1-eligible under the current statute. In contrast, we estimate that approximately 36
percent of those cases would be M1-eligible under the revised definition of
“deliberation.” 219
4.

Proportionality Review: For every case that results in a death verdict,

Missouri law requires the Supreme Court to consider “whether the sentence of death is
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.” 220 In practice, the
Court conducts this proportionality review by comparing death cases to other death
cases. 221 This study suggests that proportionality review would be more meaningful if
the Court compared death cases to non-death cases. We recommend that the Missouri
Supreme Court should modify its practice in this regard, or that the legislature should
amend the statute to require comparison of death cases to non-death cases.
B.

Recommendations Related to Statutory Aggravating Factors

Section 565.032 of the Missouri Code lists seventeen different aggravating
factors. Due to the sheer number of aggravators, and the breadth of certain aggravators,
one or more statutory aggravating factors is present in approximately 90 percent of all
M1-eligible cases. 222 We recommend the following specific statutory changes to limit
the number of cases that are death-eligible under the statute.
1.

Eliminate or limit the “wantonly vile” aggravator. This aggravator is

present in more than ninety percent of the M1-eligible small sample cases. It does not
217
218
219
220
221
222

V.A.M.S. 565.002(3).
See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
V.A.M.S. § 565.035.3(3).
See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
See supra Tables 5.4 and 5.7.
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satisfy the Zant v. Stephens requirement that aggravators must genuinely narrow the class
of death-eligible offenses. The recommended solution is to eliminate this aggravator. An
alternative approach would be to limit the aggravator so that it applies only to cases
involving torture. For these purposes, the Missouri legislature could adopt the federal
definition of “torture,” which is codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2340. 223
2.

Limit the scope of the “felony murder” aggravator. As currently drafted,

this aggravator is present in more than 50 percent of the small sample cases. The breadth
of the aggravator is primarily attributable to the fact that it covers all murders committed
in conjunction with a robbery, burglary, or drug crime. The legislature should narrow the
scope of this aggravator to restrict its application to rape-murder cases. A slightly
broader version would cover murders committed in conjunction with kidnapping and/or
sodomy.
3.

Limit the scope of the “for money” aggravator. As currently drafted, this

aggravator is present in about 45 percent of the small sample cases. The breadth of this
aggravator is primarily attributable to the fact that it covers all murders committed in
conjunction with a theft offense.

The legislature should narrow the scope of this

aggravator so that it applies only to murder-for-hire cases; it should apply both to the
person who pays and to the person who receives money for the commission of a murder.
A slightly broader version would include cases where defendant kills a relative to obtain
an inheritance, or to obtain insurance benefits.
4.

Limit the scope of the “killing witness” aggravator. As currently drafted,

this aggravator is present in about 48 percent of the small sample cases. The breadth of
application stems from the fact that the statute applies whenever “the murdered individual
was a witness or potential witness in any past or pending investigation or past or pending

223

Under the federal definition, an act does not qualify as “torture” unless it is “committed by a
person acting under the color of law.” 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1). We recommend that Missouri adopt the
federal definition without the “color of law” requirement.
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prosecution.” The legislature should narrow the scope of this aggravator so that it applies
only in cases where the victim was a subpoenaed or potential witness in a criminal case
where charges had already been filed.
5.

Eliminate the “avoiding arrest” aggravator.

As currently drafted, this

aggravator is present in about 48 percent of the small sample cases. Because there is
virtually a complete overlap between the cases covered by this aggravator, and the cases
covered by the “killing witness” aggravator, there is no need to retain this as a separate
aggravator. 224 Moreover, the cases of greatest concern are covered by either the “escaped
custody” or “concealing drug crime” aggravator.
6.

Eliminate the “agent or employee” aggravator. As currently applied, this

aggravator is present in about 41 percent of the small sample cases. The cases of greatest
concern covered by this aggravator are the murder-for-hire cases, which are also covered
by the “for money” aggravator. This aggravator also applies to other cases that involve
concerted action among two or more co-defendants, but the fact of concerted action,
without more, does not justify imposition of capital punishment.
7.

Limit the scope of the “prior record” aggravator. As currently drafted, this

aggravator applies not only to a person who has been convicted of M1; it also applies to
anyone “who has one or more serious assaultive criminal convictions.” 225 The Supreme
Court has construed this factor broadly to apply even to a defendant with a prior
conviction for second degree assault. 226 The legislature should amend the statute to limit
this aggravator to defendants with prior murder convictions.

224

See supra notes __ and accompanying text (discussing overlap between the “avoiding arrest” and
“killing witness” aggravators).
225
V.A.M.S. 565.032.2(1).
226
See State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. 1997).
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Name of Student (Research Assistant) __________________________
I.

Summary Information (Get copy of docket sheet in every case)

__________________________________
____________________________________
Name of Defendant
__________________________________
____________________________________
County
__________________________________
____________________________________
If Change of Venue, from which County?
Attorney
__________________________________
____________________________________
Judge

II.

Case Number

Circuit

Prosecuting

Defense Counsel (Pvt or PD)

Charging/Disposition (Get copies of documents, as indicated on the instructions.)

__________________________________
____________________________________
Date of Indictment/Information
__________________________________
____________________________________
Initial Charge (M1, M2, or VM)
Convicted/Pled
__________________________________
____________________________________
Jury Trial, Bench Trial, or Guilty Plea?

81

Date of Disposition

Charge for Which D

Sentence

•

If change of venue, to which county? __________________________

•

If initially charged as murder first, and jury convicted on a lesser charge, did the
prosecutor

present the first degree murder charge to the jury?
_________________________________
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III.

Death Penalty Info: (Get copies of documents, as indicated on the instructions.)

Did Prosecutor seek death penalty at any time during prosecution? ___________
How do we know that?
____________________________________________________________
Did capital charge go to jury? ___________
If not, why not?
_________________________________________________________________
If so, did jury return pro-death verdict? _____________
IV.

Additional Comments:
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Instructions for Completing Form
Part One
Fill out part one completely, if possible. Please make a copy of the docket sheet in every case (if
we don’t already have the docket sheet.) Please check the case number against the OSCA print-out to make
sure that the two numbers correspond. If the court files use one number, and the OSCA print-out has a
different number, please list both numbers on the form.

In many cases, there will be more than one judge, prosecutor, and/or defense
attorney. In each case, identify the presiding judge at the time of disposition, as well as
the lead prosecutor and lead defense attorney at the time of disposition. If you are
uncertain which person to list, then you may list more than one judge, prosecutor, etc.
For defense attorneys, indicate whether the attorney is a private attorney or a public
defender.
Part Two

Under “initial charge,” please write either “first degree murder,” “second degree
murder” or “voluntary manslaughter.” Please do the same for the entry “charge for
which D convicted/pled.” If the defendant was convicted of or pled guilty to a lesser
charge, include that information. Under “sentence,” put either “death,” “life without
parole,” or the number of years imprisonment for which defendant was sentenced.
Please be sure to make copies of the indictment/information, any amendments to the
indictment/information, any documents evidencing final conviction/sentence, and any
documents evidencing a change of venue.
If a case is reversed on appeal and the defendant gets a new trial (or a new plea
bargain), please complete a separate form for the new trial, staple the two forms together,
and include a brief explanation in the “comments” section.
Part Three

The first question in part three – whether the prosecutor sought the death penalty
at any time during the prosecution – may not be easy to answer. There are four
possibilities:
• if the initial charge was second degree murder or lower, and the charge was never
amended to first degree murder, then the answer is “no”
• if there is documentary evidence that the prosecutor did seek the death penalty at
any time during the prosecution, then the answer is “yes,” regardless of whether
the prosecutor later withdrew the capital charge
• in some cases, you may find a document indicating that the prosecution waived
the death penalty; in such cases the answer is “no” (unless the prosecution had
previously formally requested the death penalty, in which case the answer is
“yes”)
• there may be some first degree murder cases where there is no documentary
evidence one way or the other; in such cases, the answer is “no,” unless the
defendant pled guilty to first degree murder, in which case we will assume that
the answer is “yes.”
For the third and fifth questions in part three – “did capital charge go to jury?” and “did jury return
pro-death verdict” -- the answer should be either, “yes,” “no,” or “not applicable.” The second and fourth
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questions call for longer answers. If you need additional space, write “see comments” in the space
provided and put your answer in the “comments” section.
Please be sure to get copies of documents, if possible, to show: (1) whether the prosecutor sought
the death penalty, (2) whether a capital charge went to the jury, and (3) whether the jury returned a death
verdict. In all cases where the prosecutor did seek the death penalty, there is a statutory requirement to
provide the defense attorney a list of all aggravating circumstances the prosecution intends to prove at trial.
Please make a copy of any documents that show the aggravating circumstances the prosecution charged.
Part Four
Include in part four any comments about unusual or interesting aspects of the case.
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